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Cass R. Sunsteintt
Current estimates of regulatory benefits are too low and possibly far too low. This is because
the standard economic approach to measuring costs and benefits, which attempts to estimate peo-
ple's willingness to pay for various regulatory benefits, ignores a central point about valuation, thus
producing numbers that systematically understate those benefits. Conventional estimates tell us the
amount of income an individual, acting in isolation, would be willing to sacrifice in return for, say,
an increase in safety on the job. But while these estimates are based on the implicit assumption that
economic well-being depends only on absolute income, considerable vidence suggests that relative
income is also an important factor. When an individual buys additional safety in isolation, he ex-
periences not only an absolute decline in the amounts of other goods and services he can buy, but
also a decline in his relative living standards. In contrast, when a regulation requires all workers to
purchase additional safety, each worker gives up the same amount of other goods, so no worker
experiences a decline in relative living standards. If relative living standards matter, an individual
will value an across the board increase in safety more highly than an increase in safety that he
alone purchases, Where the government currently pegs the value of a statistical life at about $4 mil-
lion, it ought to employ a value between $4.7 million and $7 million. A conservative reading of the
evidence is that when government agencies are unsure how to value regulatory benefits along a
reasonable range, they should make choices toward or at the upper end.
INTRODUcTION
The movement for cost-benefit analysis of regulatory problems
has proved stunningly successful. By Executive Order, Presidents
Reagan, Bush, and Clinton have all required cost-benefit analysis of
major regulations.' Partly as a result, agencies routinely attempt to cal-
culate the costs and benefits of their activities Congress has also
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1 See Exec Order No 12291, 3 CFR 127, 128 (1981) (Reagan and Bush); Exec Order No
12866,3 CFR 638,639 (1993) (Clinton).
2 See, for example, Richard D. Morgenstern, The Legal and Institutional Setting for Eco-
nomic Analysis at EPA, in Richard D. Morgenstern, ed, Economic Analyses at EPA: Assessing
The University of Chicago Law Review
shown considerable interest in cost-benefit analysis, requiring both the
Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") and the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") to produce monetized accounts of the
consequences of regulation.' Courts themselves have been highly re-
ceptive to efforts to mandate cost-benefit analysis, asking agencies to
monetize costs, benefits, or both.' In a recent decision, the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit-the most important court in federal
regulatory law-has made clear that Congress will have to speak un-
ambiguously if it intends to forbid consideration of cost.' In sum, both
the executive and the judiciary have converged on a kind of default
rule in favor of cost-benefit analysis, to be used unless Congress ex-
pressly precludes it.
We believe that the movement toward cost-benefit analysis of
regulatory initiatives is generally desirable and that most of the con-
ventional criticisms of it are unconvincing.6 But those who approve of
cost-benefit analysis need practical ways to measure both costs and
benefits, and it is here that many questions remain, for theory and
practice alike. Our focus is on the standard economic approach, which
attempts to estimate people's willingness to pay for the various goods
at issue.7 We intend to criticize this approach on the ground that it ig-
nores a central point about valuation, thus producing numbers that
systematically undervalue the benefits of regulation.
Regulatory Impact 5, 10-12 (Resources for the Future 1997) (detailing the regulatory impact
analyses the EPA is required to perform under Executive Orders 12291 and 12866, and noting
the Office of Management and Budget's power to review these analyses); Thomas 0. McGarity,
Reinventing Rationality: The Role of Regulatory Analysis in the Federal Bureaucracy 4-5 (Cam-
bridge 1991) (noting that an essential feature of Executive Order 12291 is its requirement of ra-
tional analysis prior to implementation of a regulation).
3 Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, Pub L No 104-4,109 Stat 48 (1995), codified in various
sections of title 2 (Supp 2000). See 2 USC § 1535 (Supp 2000) (OMB); 2 USC § 1532 (Supp 2000)
(EPA).
4 See, for example, Michigan v EPA, 213 F3d 663,678-79 (DC Cir 2000) (approving EPA's
use of cost in formulating nitrogen oxide emission regulations), pet for cert filed Sept 20, 2000;
Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition v FAA, 154 F3d 455, 475 (DC Cir 1998) (approving FAA
analysis of costs to air tour industry in considering an overflight restriction rule for Grand Can-
yon National Park); Corrosion Proof Fittings v EPA, 947 F2d 1201,1222-23 (5th Cir 1991) (re-
jecting EPA ban on asbestos for failing to consider the costs involved); Natural Resources De-
fense Council v EPA, 937 F2d 641,645-46 (DC Cir 1991) (approving EPA cost-benefit analysis in
applying Clean Air Act to surface coal mines).
5 Michigan v EPA, 213 F3d at 678. See Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles,
99 Mich L Rev (forthcoming June 2001).
6 For a general discussion, see Robert H. Frank, Why Is Cost-Benefit Analysis So Contro-
versial?, 29 J Legal Stud 913 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J
Legal Stud 1059, 1073-88 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice 245-70 (Ox-
ford 1997).
7 For a general discussion, see W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and Private Respon-
sibilities for Risk (Oxford 1992).
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Policy analysts rely for the most part on two methods for estimat-
ing willingness to pay. One is the hedonic pricing method, which at-
tempts to infer valuations from observable market behavior.8 For ex-
ample, analysts might estimate the value of safety by examining how
wages vary with workplace injury levels.9 In the contingent valuation
approach, generally used when market evidence is unavailable, ana-
lysts ask how much people would be willing to pay to reduce or avoid
a wide range of dangers-specific health problems associated with
ozone or particulate matter; various kinds of workplace-related mor-
tality risks; risks associated with air travel; risks of injury or death in
automobile accidents; and so on.'° Relying primarily on hedonic pric-
ing studies, but also on contingent valuation studies, federal agencies
have used estimates of the value of a statistical life saved that range
from $1.5 million (used by the Federal Aviation Administration
("FAA")) to $5.8 million (used at least once, but not consistently, by
the EPA)."
Monetization, as measured by estimates of willingness to pay, is
not limited to mortality risks. For example, the EPA recently provided
a wide range of numbers for health problems short of mortality.'2 It
considers a risk of congestive heart failure to be worth $16,600 for
people sixty-five and over.3 It considers an episode of acute bronchitis
to be worth $45; an emergency visit to the hospital for asthma, $9,000;
chronic bronchitis, $260,000; and a single episode of shortness of
breath, $5.30. In all cases, these numbers are generated on the basis
of estimates of what affected individuals would be willing to pay to
avoid negative outcomes.
For present purposes we shall simply assume that these numbers
are basically sound, in the sense that they represent good estimates of
private willingness to pay.'" We nonetheless suggest that the actual
numbers on which federal agencies rely understate the social benefits
8 See Robert W. Hahn and John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Review and
Synthesis, 8 Yale J Reg 233,241-43 (1991).
9 See Richard Thaler and Sherwin Rosen, The Value of Saving a Life: Evidence from the
Labor Market, in Nestor E. Terleckyj, ed, Household Production and Consumption 265, 292-97
(Natl Bur Econ Research 1976) (finding, through economic modeling of risk premiums built into
the wages of risky occupations, the value of a life in those occupations equal to $176,000-
$260,000 per 0.1 percent chance of death).
10 For a general discussion, see Paul R. Portney, The Contingent Valuation Debate: Why
Economists Should Care, 8 J Econ Persp 3,3-6 (Fall 1994).
11 See Mathew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When
Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J Legal Stud 1105,1146 (2000).
12 U.S. EPA Innovative Strategies & Economics Grodp, Office of Air Quality Planning &
Standards, Regulatory Impact Analyses for the Particulate Matter and Ozone National Ambient
Air Quality Standards and Proposed Regional Haze Rule 12-43 (1997).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 This is an assumption and no more.
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of many regulations by a substantial amount. It follows that important
policies are being defended, and made, on the basis of assessments
that greatly undervalue the net benefits of regulatory interventions.
Where the government currently says that the value of a statistical life
is about $4 million, it ought to be saying that the value is somewhere
between $4.7 million and $7 million. At the very least, our analysis
suggests that when government agencies are unsure how to value
regulatory benefits along a reasonable range, they should make
choices toward or at the upper end.
The essential reason for our claim is that people care a great deal
about their relative economic position, and not solely, and often not
mostly, about their absolute economic position. Current estimates tell
us what an individual, acting in isolation, would be willing to pay for,
say, an increase in safety on the job.6 But when an individual buys ad-
ditional safety in isolation, he experiences not only an absolute decline
in the amounts of other goods and services he can buy, but also a de-
cline in his relative living standards. In contrast, when a regulation re-
quires all workers to purchase additional safety, each worker gives up
the same amount of other goods, so no worker experiences a decline
in relative living standards. If relative living standards matter, then an
individual will value an across-the-board increase in safety more
highly than an increase in safety that he alone purchases.
The "willingness to pay" numbers used in the standard estimates
take no account of this difference; they are based on an implicit as-
sumption that individuals care only about absolute living standards,
not at all about relative living standards. This assumption is wrong. If
people could maintain their relative economic position, they would be
willing to pay more, and possibly a great deal more, to purchase many
of the goods that regulation attempts to deliver. A central assumption
here, which we defend in some detail, is that income is in large part a
positional good, valued in terms of relative position, whereas many
regulatory benefits, such as health care, safety, parental leave, and lei-
sure time, are largely or primarily nonpositional goods, valued for
their own sake and more independently of what others have.
Our minimal claim, then, is that existing numbers are too low in-
sofar as they fail to take account of concerns about relative economic
position, and that a serious conceptual defect is thus inherent in cur-
rent approaches, one that merits much further investigation. Our more
ambitious claim is that in order to be accurate, the existing numbers
should be increased substantially, and we attempt to show how the
16 See, for example, W. Michael Hanemann, Valuing the Environment hrough Contingent
Valuation, 8 J Econ Persp 19, 21-26 (Fall 1994) (describing typical contingent valuation survey
involving individual person's willingness to pay $x for environmental protection).
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more accurate numbers might be generated. We hope that those who
object to that particular attempt will be motivated not to defend the
implausible view that absolute position is all that matters, but to de-
velop more accurate ways to incorporate positional concerns into
cost-benefit analysis.
The arguments we make here go well beyond the particular area
of cost-benefit analysis. In many contexts, consumers find themselves
on a positional treadmill, in which their choices do not really make
them happier or better off, but instead serve largely to keep them in
the same spot in the hierarchy." Many actual and imaginable laws can
stop or slow down the positional treadmill, thus maintaining people's
relative position while also giving them something of value. People
care about maintaining relative position not only because of envy,
status-seeking, signaling, or reputational concerns; a particularly im-
portant point is that the frame of reference for evaluating many goods
and services is set socially rather than individually, and inevitably so."'
For many goods and services, the holdings and actions of others pro-
vide the frame of reference against which each person evaluates his
own holdings and actions. When the frame of reference changes,
evaluations will change as well. Improvements in the frame of refer-
ence often mean that people experience previously satisfactory goods
and services as undesirable, in a kind of prisoner's dilemma that may
be best solved through law. We will discuss a number of examples
here. While our focus is on cost-benefit analysis, an especially salient
current topic, our discussion bears on many other problems as well.
This Article comes in several parts. Part I traces the rise of cost-
benefit analysis within the national government, gives a sense of the
numbers that government institutions are now using, and briefly ex-
plains how those numbers have been chosen. Part II discusses the cen-
tral importance of relative economic position to people's perceptions
of their own well-being. Part III explores how some of the key benefit
calculations would be altered by an understanding of the importance
of relative position. Part IV discusses several theoretical issues, focus-
ing on the objection that positional concerns should play no role in
17 See Robert H. Frank, The Demand for Unobservable and Other Nonpositional Goods,
75 Am Econ Rev 101, 102-03 (1985) (asserting that workers will work under less optimal condi-
tions to maintain relative position compared to coworkers). Consider the recent remarks from
Ted Turner during a commencement address at Emerson College: "It's all relative.... I sit down
and say, geez, I've only got $10 billion, but Bill Gates has $100 billion, I feel like I'm a complete
failure in life. So billions won't make you happy if you're worried about someone who's got more
than you.... So don't let yourself get caught in a trap by measuring your success by how much
material success you have." People 62 (June 12, 2000).
18 See Robert H. Frank, The Frame of Reference as a Public Good, 107 Econ J 1832, 1839-
40 (1997) (noting that we cannot improve our well-being by increased consumption because oth-
ers will also increase to compensate, leaving the same distribution of well-being).
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public policy. Part V explores some limits and extensions of our argu-
ment. We consider the implications of the fact that many regulatory
programs benefit not all people but subclasses, and we discuss how
positional concerns help justify nonwaivable contractual terms in em-
ployment law.
I. THE GROWTH OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
In this section, we outline the rise of cost-benefit analysis, as pro-
duced by the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of the na-
tional government. The general lesson is that we are fast approaching
the end of a "first generation" debate, between advocates and critics
of cost-benefit analysis, with general victory for the advocates.9 At the
same time, we have only started to enter into the equally important
"second generation" debate, over the appropriate method for valuing
costs and benefits. Neither Congress nor courts have given even mini-
mal guidance for valuing regulatory benefits, and there is a great deal
of unexplained disparity even within the practices of those agencies
firmly committed to cost-benefit principles.
A. Executive Branch: A Presidential "Supermandate," but Without
Specifying Values
During the last twenty years, cost-benefit analysis has become a
prominent practice within the executive branch of the national gov-
ernment. Though economic advisers have attempted to ensure cost-
benefit review since the Nixon Administration,0 the cost-benefit prin-
ciple did not receive prominent recognition until Executive Order
12291," issued by President Reagan in 1981. The purposes of this ex-
ecutive order were to ensure that all major rules would be subject to
cost-benefit analysis and that such analysis would be the basis of deci-
sion, at least to the extent permitted by law.2 At the same time, OMB
was entrusted with the power to oversee agency cost-benefit analyses
to ensure their basic rationality and sense.23 The movement in the di-
19 By this we mean both a political victory and an intellectual victory. One of us has criti-
cized some defenses of cost-benefit analysis on the ground that they wrongly assume the "com-
mensurability" of all social goods. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in
Law, 92 Mich L Rev 779, 842 (1994) (asserting that diverse goods cannot be analyzed meaning-
fully on a single cost-benefit metric). But this criticism is not meant as an objection to the com-
parison of costs and benefits as a policy tool, designed to discipline inquiry. See id. We are con-
cerned here with cost-benefit analysis as a policy tool, and for that purpose it is not necessary to
engage in other, more abstract debates on the nature of human valuation.
20 See Richard H. Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U Chi
L Rev 1,13-14 (1995) (discussing Nixon's use of OMB to evaluate proposed agency regulations).
21 3 CFR at 128.
22 Id at 128-30.
23 Id.
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rection of cost-benefit analysis was much accelerated in 1985 with the
issuance of Executive Order 12498,24 requiring that cost-benefit analy-
sis provide the basis for an annual "Regulatory Program" to be issued
by all executive agencies. It was pursuant to this executive order that
annual volumes, often containing OMB instructions for the valuation
of risks, became a prominent basis for understanding federal regula-
tory activity.'
Many people doubted whether President Clinton would endorse
the idea that regulatory judgments should be made with close refer-
ence to cost-benefit balancing. Despite the misgivings of some envi-
ronmental organizations, President Clinton's Executive Order 12866,"
issued in 1993, firmly embraced cost-benefit analysis as a central in-
gredient in regulatory decisions. The Order does shift, in certain ways,
from the Reagan-Bush initiatives, principally via references to "eq-
uity" and "distributive impacts" as relevant factors in agency analysis.7
But these are modest changes in a presidential requirement that con-
tinues to require cost-benefit analysis of major rules. Thus the execu-
tive branch has endorsed cost-benefit balancing for over twenty years.
It seems reasonable to suggest that insofar as the White House is
overseeing the federal regulatory process, cost-benefit analysis will
continue to play a central organizing role, no matter the party affilia-
tion of the president.
Notwithstanding this point, a key limitation in the current process
within the executive branch is the absence of an agreed-upon system
for assessing the relevant values." As we shall soon see, agency prac-
tices are widely divergent. OMB has attempted to discipline agency
inquiry, but only through unenforced and somewhat vague guidance
and occasional intervention,9 and without much of an underlying the-
ory aside from general reliance on private "willingness to pay."
24 Exec Order No 12498,3 CFR 323 (1985).
25 See, for example, OMB, Regulatory Program of the United States Government, April 1,
1985-March 31, 1986 (Executive Office of the President 1985); for OMB's most recent statement,
see OMB, Economic Analysis of Federal Regulations Under Executive Order 12866 (Executive
Office of the President 1996). Like all other governmental bodies, OMB ignores positional con-
siderations in its effort to state "best practices" for cost-benefit analysis.
26 3 CFR 638.
27 Id at 639.
28 For a complaint in this vein, see Robert W. Hahn, et al, Assessing the Quality of Regula-
tory Impact Analyses, Working Paper 00-1 at 2-3 (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Reg Stud
2000). See OMB, Economic Analysis of Federal Regulations Under Executive Order 12866 (cited
in note 25), for an effort to codify "best practices"; but OMB's guidance is merely that, and hence
has no binding quality. See id at 9-10 (examining "alternative baselines" that agencies "may
choose" to estimate costs and benefits).
29 See OMB, Economic Analysis of Federal Regulations Under Executive Order 12866
(cited in note 25); McGarity, Reinventing Rationality at ch 18,271-91 (cited in note 2).
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B. Courts: A Cost-Benefit Default Principle
The executive branch has not acted alone. In one of the most
noteworthy developments in the last twenty years of administrative
law, courts have also enforced a form of cost-benefit balancing, at least
where Congress has not barred them from doing so. Indeed, the most
dramatic innovation, noted above, is a new doctrine permitting and
possibly even requiring cost-benefit analysis unless Congress has ex-
pressly directed otherwise.3' Federal law now reflects a kind of default
principle: Agencies may consider costs, and thus undertake cost-
benefit analysis, unless Congress has unambiguously said that they
cannot.
Thus judges have invalidated regulatory action that imposes high
costs without significant benefits.32 They have also policed agency ac-
tion to ensure at least a rough kind of proportionality between costs
and benefits." Sometimes courts have been quite aggressive in requir-
ing proportionality as part of their function in reviewing agency action
to test whether it is "arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.""M
Courts have insisted that some amounts of money are too much to
spend for small benefits.35 On the other hand, they have failed to give
much guidance for deciding, in general, when a particular cost-benefit
ratio will be unlawful. Here, as within the executive branch, the ap-
propriate valuation of regulatory benefits has received exceedingly lit-
tle attention.
30 See notes 4-5; Corrosion Proof Fittings v EPA, 947 F2d 1201,1210 (5th Cir 1991) (noting
that "only where congressional intent is pellucid are we entitled to reject reasonable administra-
tive construction of a statute"), quoting National Grain & Feed Association v OSHA, 866 F2d
717,733 (5th Cir 1989); Sunstein, 99 Mich L Rev (cited in note 5).
31 See Michigan v EPA, 213 F3d 663,678-79 (DC Cir 2000) (finding no congressional in-
tent in text or history of Section 110 of the Clean Air Act to preclude a cost-benefit analysis in
setting nitrogen oxide emission standards), pet for cert filed Sept 20, 2000.
32 See, for example, Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F2d at 1222-23 (invalidating asbestos ban
for lack of cost analysis); AFL-CIO v OSHA, 965 F2d 962, 986 (11th Cir 1992) (invalidating
OSHA's air contaminants standard for failing to determine the "material risk" posed by the con-
taminants). Industrial Union Dept, AFL-CIO v American Petroleum Institute, 448 US 607 (1980),
is in the same general spirit. There the plurality held that OSHA must show a "significant health
risk" before regulating a toxic substance. Id at 615. The Court subsequently found it unnecessary
to determine if OSHA was required to engage in cost-benefit analysis. Id at 640. But in asserting
the need for a demonstration of a significant risk, the plurality emphasized that an alternative
view "would give OSHA power to impose enormous costs that might produce little, if any, dis-
cernible benefit." Id at 645.
33 See, for example, Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F2d at 1223 (rejecting regulation whose
costs are ten.times the benefits).
34 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC § 706 (1994).
35 See, for example, Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F2d at 1223 (finding unreasonable a cost
of $23.7 million for saving one-third of a statistical life).
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C. Congress and the Failed Supermandate
Executive and judicial developments do not mean that the regu-
latory state is now routinely subject to scrutiny for conformity with
cost-benefit criteria: Presidents and courts have circumscribed au-
thority; they must act consistently with federal statutes, which often
forbid cost-benefit balancing. Consider, for example, the Clean Air
Act," the Clean Water Act, M the Occupational Safety and Health Act,39
the Delaney Clause,4' and the Safe Drinking Water Act"- all of which
contain provisions banning agencies from balancing costs against
benefits. It is partly for this reason that the American regulatory state
contains many regulations imposing high costs not justified by corre-
sponding benefits."
Much of the contemporary interest in regulatory reform has
therefore been directed toward Congress. Consider the fact that in the
mid-1990s, repeated efforts were made to impose a "supermandate"
that would require all agencies to undertake cost-benefit analysis and
to make decisions on the basis of that analysis. Notably, these pro-
posals included no guidance for the valuation of life and other bene-
fits from regulation." Partly because of irreconcilable legislative dif-
ferences over the question of valuation, the proposed supermandate
was defeated." But the national legislature has not uniformly rejected
cost-benefit balancing.
In the area of health and environmental protection, two impor-
tant statutes, involving toxic substances and pesticides, contemplate a
form of cost-benefit analysis.16 More recently and more globally, the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act contains two relevant provisions,
imposed on all regulatory activity. First, significant regulatory actions
must be accompanied by a statement that includes "a qualitative and
36 See McGarity, Reinventing Rationality at ch 18-19,271-300 (cited in note 2) (noting the
often acrimonious relationship between OMB and the agencies it reviews and describing the
"modest role" of courts reviewing regulatory analyses).
37 42 USC §§ 7401 et seq (1994).
38 33 USC §§ 1251 et seq (1994).
39 29 USC §§ 651 et seq (1994).
40 21 USC §§ 348(c)(3)(A), 360b(d)(1)(I), 379e(b)(5)(B) (1994).
41 42 USC §§ 300j et seq (1994).
42 For a general discussion, see Robert W. Hahn, Regulatory Reform: What Do the Gov-
ernment's Numbers Tell Us?, in Robert W. Hahn, ed, Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved: Getting Better
Results from Regulation 208 (Oxford 1996); Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs at ch 14, 128-46 (cited in note
7).
43 See Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48
Stan L Rev 247,272-82 (1996).
44 See id at 292-93.
45 See id at 272-84.
46 Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 USC §§ 2601 et seq (1994); Federal Insecticide, Fungi-
cide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 USC §§ 136 et seq (1994).
47 109 Stat 48.
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quantitative assessment of the anticipated costs and benefits of the
Federal mandate." Second, all agencies must "identify and consider a
reasonable number of regulatory alternatives and from those alterna-
tives select the least costly, most cost-effective, or least burdensome al-
ternative that achieves the objectives of the rule."49 These provisions
enshrine a form of cost-benefit analysis for major rules; but in keeping
with the pattern that we have seen thus far, they are silent on how
agencies are supposed to value the goods at stake.
D. Practice
What have agencies actually done when performing cost-benefit
analysis? It is clear that the general practice is to build on some ver-
sion of the contingent valuation and hedonic pricing methods dis-
cussed above. Thus agencies attempt to measure people's willingness
to pay, using actual choices if possible, and contingent valuation if
necessary. It is on the basis of this sort of analysis that the EPA re-
cently compiled the following table:'
48 2 USC § 1532(a)(2) (Supp 2000).
49 2 USC § 1535(a). Of course a cost-effectiveness principle should not be identified with a
cost-benefit requirement. The idea that agencies should seek the lowest cost way of achieving a
goal is narrower and less controversial than the idea that agencies should compare costs with
benefits.
50 U.S. EPA, Regulatory Impact Analyses (cited in note 12).
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TABLE 1
WILLINGNESS TO PAY ESTIMATES
(Mean Values)
Health Endpoint Mean WTP Value per Incident
(1990 dollars)
Mortality:
Life saved $4.8 million
Life year extended $120,000
Hospital Admissions:
All Respiratory Illnesses, all ages $12,700
Pneumonia, age 65 $13,400
COPD, age _> 65 $15,900
Ischemic Heart Disease, age 2 65 $20,600
Congestive Heart Failure, age 65 $16,600
Emergency Visits for Asthma $9,000
Chronic Bronchitis $260,000
Upper Respiratory Symptoms $19
Lower Respiratory Symptoms $12
Acute Bronchitis $45
Acute Respiratory Symptoms $18
(any of 19)
Asthma $32
Shortness of Breath $5.30
Sinusitis and Hay Fever Not monetized
Work Loss Days $83
Restricted Activity Days (RAD):
Minor RAD $38
Respiratory RAD Not monetized
Worker Productivity $1 per worker per 10%
change in ozone
Visibility:
Residential $14 per unit decrease in
deciview per household
Recreational Range of $7.30 to $11 per
unit decrease in deciview
per household
Household Soiling Damage $2.50 per household per
pg/m3
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But there is also a great deal of variation both within and across
agencies. With respect to statistical lives, consider the following table:5'
TABLE 2
VALUATIONS OF LIFE
Agency Regulation Citation Value
($ mil)
Department Proposed Estab- 55 Fed Reg 32064 $1.5
of Transportation - lishment of the (Aug 6, 1990)
Federal Aviation Harlingen Airport
Administration Radar Service
Area, TX
Department Pathogen Reduc- 61 Fed Reg 38806 $1.6
of Agriculture - tion: Hazard (July 25, 1996)
Food Safety and Analysis and Criti-
Inspection Service cal Control Point
Systems
Department of Regulations Re- 61 Fed Reg 44396 $2.5
Health and Human stricting the Sale (Aug 28, 1996)
Services -Food and and Distribution





Department Aircraft Flight 61 Fed Reg 34508 $2.7
of Transportation- Simulator Use in (July 2, 1996)




Environmental Protection of 53 Fed Reg 30566 $3.0
Protection Agency Stratospheric (Aug 12, 1988)
Ozone
Department of Proposed Rules to 56 Fed Reg 60856 $3.0
Health and Human Amend the Food (Nov 27, 1991)
Services- Labeling Regula-
Food and Drug Ad- tions
ministration
51 Borrowed from Adler and Posner, 29 J Legal Stud at 1146 (cited in note 11).
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Agency Regulation Citation Value
($ mil)
Department Proposed National 59 Fed Reg 30218 $1.5,3.0
of Agriculture- School Lunch Pro- (June 10, 1994)
Food and Nutrition gram and School
Service Breakfast Program
Environmental National Ambient 62 Fed Reg 38652 $4.8
Protection Agency Air Quality Stan- (July 18,1997)
dards for Particu-
late Matter
Environmental National Ambient 62 Fed Reg 38856 $4.8
Protection Agency Air Quality Stan- (July 18, 1996)
dards for Ozone
Department of Medical Devices: 61 Fed Reg 52602 $5.0
Health and Human Current Good (Oct 7,1996)
Services- Food and Manufacturing
Drug Administra- Practice
tion
Department of Quality Mammog- 62 Fed Reg 55852 $5.0





Environmental Pro- Requirements for 61 Fed Reg 45778 $5.5





Environmental Pro- National Primary 63 Fed Reg 69390 $5.6





Environmental Pro- Radon in Drinking 64 Fed Reg 9560 $5.8
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We do not intend to give a full answer to the question of which of
these numbers is appropriate. But we do mean to identify a substantial
problem with current practice, a problem with which agencies have yet
to come to terms or even to acknowledge.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF RELATIVE POSITION
We now attempt to show that relative economic position is im-
portant for people's subjective and objective well-being, and that ab-
solute economic position is less significant than is ordinarily thought.
For purposes of establishing our minimal proposition here, it is neces-
sary only to establish that willingness to pay numbers undervalue
safety and other benefits if they ignore concerns about relative posi-
tion. (Notice that we are assuming a point that we will defend below:
For many regulatory benefits, positional considerations are less impor-
tant than they are for income.) We draw on a wide array of evidence
in order to establish this point. Of course each piece of evidence is
vulnerable to counterarguments, at least if taken on its own, and we
will not be reluctant to mention some counterarguments here. But
taken as a whole, the evidence strongly suggests that traditional meth-
ods of estimating willingness to pay seriously understate the social
value of many regulatory benefits.
A. Survey Evidence
1. A thought experiment.
Consider two hypothetical worlds:
World A: You earn $110,000 per year, others earn $200,000.
World B: You earn $100,000 per year, others earn $85,000.
The income figures represent real purchasing power. Thus your
higher income in World A would enable you to purchase a house that
is 10 percent larger than the house you would be able to afford in
World B, 10 percent more restaurant meals, and so on. Faced with a
once-and-for-all choice between these two worlds, which would you
choose?
The economic theory that underlies cost-benefit analysis suggests
that World A is the uniquely correct choice. The question unambigu-
ously specifies that the income figures represent real purchasing
power, and hence prices would not be higher in World A than World
B. Neoclassical economics rests on the assumption that people derive
satisfaction primarily from the absolute quantity of goods and services
they consume. On that measure, World A is better because it offers
higher absolute consumption for every citizen. (For choosers who do
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not want higher levels of consumption, no matter; they might put the
money in the bank for their children, or give it to their favorite char-
ity.) That fact notwithstanding, however, a substantial proportion of
people confronted with this choice say they would opt for World B .
We do not claim that theirs is necessarily the better choice. But
we do argue that it is a rational and coherent one, in part because of
the importance of what the late economist Fred Hirsch called posi-
tional goods." A positional good is one whose value depends in signifi-
cant part on how it compares with goods in the same class consumed
by others." The ability to purchase such goods depends strongly on
one's position in the relevant distribution of income." For example,
one's ability to buy a fine painting or a house with a good view typi-
cally depends more on relative income than on absolute income. But
such goods are not the only reason that relative income is important.
Some people want to be toward the top of any relevant hierarchy;
many more do not want to be at the bottom; and below we will discuss
evidence that once a threshold level of affluence is reached, physical
and psychological well-being are much better predicted by relative
consumption levels than by absolute consumption levels.1
6
2. The happiness surveys.
Perhaps the most striking evidence of the importance of relative
position comes in the form of happiness surveys conducted over time
in a variety of countries.7 These surveys asked people to report
52 See, for example, Sara J. Solnick and David Hemenway, Is More Always Better?: A Sur-
vey on Positional Concerns, 37 J Econ Beh & Org 373, 378-81 (1998). When these authors of-
fered subjects a choice similar to the one we posed above, 56 percent chose the world with higher
relative income and lower absolute income. Similar numbers-with about half opting for higher
relative income-have emerged from several experiments, with about 200 subjects, involving law
students at the University of Chicago Law School.
In a recent discussion of these experiments, Judge Posner complains, "[R]elative income is
important as a signal of how well one is doing. If your boss is paying you a lot less than someone
who does similar work, something is wrong, unless you have decided to substitute nonpecuniary
for pecuniary income. Evening out all incomes would thus deprive people of a great deal of in-
formation about their status and prospects." Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition,
Justification, and Comment on Conference Papers, 29 J Legal Stud 1153, 1166-67 (2000). The
point is correct but not responsive. We agree that relative pay is an important signal, and to make
this point is not to argue for evening out all incomes.
53 Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth 1-12 (Harvard 1976) (positing that the pursuit of
self-interest to advance "to a higher place among one's fellows" results in an overconsumption of
private goods, reducing the overall net social utility).
54 See Robert H. Frank, Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for
Status 7 (Oxford 1985) (noting that positional goods are "sought after ... because they compare
favorably with others in their own class").
55 See, for example, id at 8-11 (noting that the most valuable positional goods are the mr,
sought after and only the "contest winners" will obtain those goods).
56 For an extensive summary of this evidence, see id at ch 2.
57 See Richard A. Easterlin, Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? Some Em-
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whether they are "very happy," "fairly happy," or "not happy." Such
surveys have found that happiness levels within a country at a given
moment are strongly positively correlated with relative position in the
country's income distribution.9 But the same studies find only weak
long-term trends in average reported happiness levels, even for coun-
tries whose incomes have been growing steadily over time.0 The coun-
terintutive conclusion is that substantial increases in economic growth
61do not produce substantial increases in subjective well-being.
In the early studies, Richard Easterlin found little relationship be-
tween increases in material living standards and subjective well-
being.2 More particularly, Easterlin found three important patterns in
the data. First, average happiness levels within a given country are
stable over time, even in nations experiencing significant economic
growth.'V Second, happiness levels across individuals within a given
country do vary with income.6 Richer people are, on average, more
satisfied than poorer people within the same nation.6 ' Third, average
reported happiness levels are not well correlated with average levels
of national income." Nations with high levels of average income do
not show higher average happiness than nations with lower levels of
67average income. In Easterlin's view, these patterns tend to suggest
that relative income is far more important than absolute income in de-
termining people's subjective well-being.6
More recently, it has been found that at very low levels of
poverty, increases in absolute income do tend to increase self-reported
happiness.6 When people lack adequate food or shelter, they are likely
to report themselves as happier as economic growth reduces those
needs.° It has also been found that average satisfaction levels are sig-
pirical Evidence, in Paul A. David and Melvin W. Reder, eds, Nations and Households in Eco-
nomic Growth: Essays in Honor of Moses Abramovitz 89, 100 (Academic 1974).
58 Idat 91.
59 Id at 100 ("In every single survey, those in the highest status group were happier.").
60 Id at 108-11 (finding a weak increase in happiness levels in the United States from
1946-70).
61 Seeid at 111.
62 Id at 89, 111 (finding "weak" association between increased income over time and hap-
piness).




67 Id at 106-07.
68 Id at 113-16.
69 See Ed Diener and Carol Diener, The Wealth of Nations Revisited: Income and Quality
of Life, 36 Soc Indicators Research 275, 284 (1995) (finding rapid increase in quality of life indi-
cators as societies' incomes rose above dire poverty).
70 Id at 279 ("It can be seen .. that for the lower levels of income, there is a rapid rise in
meeting physical needs as income increases.").
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nificantly higher in rich countries than in very poor ones." But the ba-
sic pattern identified by Easterlin continues to hold: average satisfac-S 72
tion levels are not significantly correlated over time with income.
3. Questions and puzzles.
At a minimum, these findings demonstrate that relative income is
more important than absolute income as a determinant of self-
reported happiness levels. But several questions might be raised about
the implications of these findings for our claims here.
First, what is the relationship between self-reported happiness
and subjective happiness? Is anything real being measured? Self-
reported happiness might seem to invite social comparisons; people
might rate their happiness by asking how they compare to others, and
hence substantial differences in happiness levels between wealthy and
less wealthy nations might not be picked up by the responses even if
substantial differences exist. It is thus possible that subjective happi-
ness measures are simply void of normative significance.
Plausible in the abstract, this objection turns out to be wrong, or
at best greatly overstated, for there is considerable evidence that self-
reported happiness does measure something of significance. Numer-
ous studies have found strong positive relationships between reported
happiness levels and observable physiological and behavioral meas-
ures of well-being.73 People who report that they are not happy, for ex-
ample, are more likely to experience headaches, rapid heartbeat, di-
gestive disorders, and other psychosomatic ailments.14 Those who rate
themselves as very happy are more likely than others to be rated as
happy by their friends, more likely to initiate social contacts, less likely
to seek psychological counseling, and less likely to attempt suicide."A second question involves the relationship between subjective
happiness and objective well-being.'6 People with a greater capacity to
purchase goods and services may not be subjectively happier, but hey
may be far better off. Among other things, they are likely to be health-
ier and to live longer lives.7' It is therefore reasonable to say that peo-
ple who earn $70,000 in a society where that is the median income are
71 Id at 283 ("Universal human values appear to be achieved to'a greater degree in wealth-
ier than in poorer societies.").
72 Id at 279-81 (noting that "for much of the income distribution there is a ceiling effect").
73 For a more detailed survey of this evidence, see Norman M. Bradburn and David Cap-
lovitz, Reports on Happiness: A Pilot Study of Behavior Related to Mental Health 25-56 (Aldine
1965).
74 Id at 26.
75 Norman Bradburn, The Structure of Psychological Well-Being (Aldine 1969).
76 For a general discussion, see Amartya Sen, Development As Freedom (Knopf 1999).
77 See, for example, Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs at 285-86 (cited in note 7), for striking evidence
of declining risks of death since 1930.
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likely to have better lives, other things being equal, than people who
earn $30,000 in a society where that is the median income-even if
people in these different societies report the same subjective happi-
ness. The fact that people in relatively poor nations show relatively
high levels of subjective happiness may simply reflect adaptation to
relative deprivation.8
We agree that subjective happiness is not all that matters; it does
79not capture everything that a society should be aiming to promote.
Economic growth is certainly desirable insofar as it increases longev-
ity and diminishes various risks to life and health, even if it has no ef-
fect whatever on subjective well-being. But subjective happiness is an
important component- of overall well-being, and a society whose
members mostly report themselves as "unhappy" surely has a serious
problem, just as a society whose members report themselves as
"happy" is entitled to congratulate itself on this fact. If any income
loss from a regulatory intervention does not itself decrease subjective
happiness, and if the intervention confers substantial benefits, subjec-
tive and otherwise, it would seem likely that people are gaining rather
than losing; and this is sufficient for our claims here.
A third question has to do with loss aversion.8' It is now well-
established that people dislike losses more than they like correspond-
81ing gains. It follows that surprisingly little subjective gain may be cre-
ated by increases in income, even if equivalent decreases in income
would indeed create subjective losses. Perhaps people do not report
themselves as significantly happier when income increases; but this
does not show that they would not report themselves as significantly
less happy if income were to decrease. The point matters for our claim
here, since we will be suggesting that the economic losses associated
with regulation do not matter a great deal to subjective well-being if
relative position is held constant. But loss aversion does not under-
mine our basic claims. Even if people dislike losses from the status
78 See the discussion of adaptive preferences in Jon Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Sub-
version of Rationality ch 3 (Cambridge 1983).
79 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach
111-48 (Cambridge 2000); Sen, Development As Freedom at 16 (cited in note 76) (discussing the
importance of political and civil liberty).
80 See, for example, Richard Thaler, Quasi-Rational Economics 147, 169 (Russell Sage
1991) (defining loss aversion as valuing a possessed item at a larger value than you would pay to
replace it).
81 For a general discussion, see id; Jennifer Arlen, Matthew Spitzer, and Eric Talley, En-
dowment Effects, Other-Regarding Preferences and Corporate Law, Olin Working Paper No 00-2
at 9-20 (USC Law School 2000), available online at <http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.tafabstract-
id=224435> (visited November 13,2000).
82 See, for example, Truman F Bewley, Why Wages Don't Fall during a Recession ch 21
(Harvard 1999) (urging that downward wage rigidity results from the disproportionate effect of
wage reduction on worker morale).
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quo more than they like equivalent gains, people's fear that losses will
produce significant subjective loss is not borne out by reality.83 If rela-
tive position is held constant, it is extremely unlikely that income
losses, of the relatively small sort that we are discussing here, would
produce more than transitory subjective losses, especially because the
relevant measures will be producing regulatory benefits at the same
time.
B. Behavioral Evidence
Survey measures of subjective well-being are not the only evi-
dence that people care strongly about relative income. Unlike psy-
chologists, who often rely on survey evidence, economists prefer be-
havioral evidence when attempting to make inferences about what
people care about. The relevant literature is not extensive, but there
are several studies that shed light on the strength of concerns about
relative income.
1. The sisters study.
In a recent paper, the economists David Neumark and Andrew
Postlewaite investigated how individual labor supply decisions depend
on the incomes of important reference group members." They argue
that if someone cares strongly about how her income compares with
the incomes of others, an increase in others' incomes will cause her to
become more likely to seek employment, or more likely to work
longer hours if she is already employed.m The difficulty in testing such
predictions has always been that it is hard to know whose incomes
really matter to the decisionmaker. Most people presumably care
most about the incomes of those with whom they associate most
closely. Unfortunately, researchers seldom have reliable data about
who knows whom, much less identifying the specific individuals about
whom people care most.
Neumark and Postlewaite cleverly finesse this problem by exam-
ining the behavior of sisters."6 The specific question they pose is this:
Does a woman's decision about whether to work outside the home
depend on her sister's economic circumstances? According to eco-
83 See, for example, George Loewenstein and David Schkade, Wouldn't It Be Nice? Predict-
ing Future Feelings, in Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener, and Norbert Schwarz, eds, Well-Being: The
Foundations of Hedonic Psychology 85 (Russell Sage 1999).
84 David Neumark and Andrew Postlewaite, Relative Income Concerns and the Rise in
Married Women's Employment, 70 J Pub Econ 157, 181 (1998) (finding women more likely to
work if their employment would enhance the family's income relative to a sister's family's in-
come).
85 Id at 163-66.
86 Id at 172-73.
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nomic orthodoxy, which holds that only her own absolute income mat-
ters to her, it would not. But Neumark and Postlewaite find differently
for a large sample of women whose sisters are not employed. Specifi-
cally, they find that such a woman is 16 to 25 percent more likely to
work outside the home if her sister's husband earns more than her
own husband.g This is strong evidence that relative position matters to
both perceived well-being and actual behavior.
2. Employer and employee behavior.
Surveys of employers and employees suggest that salaries depend
a great deal on what employees think other people are receiving, and
that perceptions of relative position have large effects on morale.
"Few workers have a precise notion of market wages or wages that
are fair in some absolute sense. Rather, they make comparisons with
their own past pay and with the pay of co-workers." As we will dis-
cuss in more detail below, the internal wage structure of firms is highly
responsive to this point, partly because employers do not want to en-
courage bickering and shirking by making some workers think that
they are being underpaid relative to coworkers. In the words of an of-
ficial responsible for international job placement, "Inequity causes
disharmony. Employees want more money if a new person is paid
more than they are."" In the words of the director of a small organiza-
tion, "I have had difficulty with people receiving different pay who
had similar skills and worked in different parts of the building....
They felt underpaid and undervalued."9'
Many companies respond to people's concerns about relative
economic position with relatively rigid "grade and step systems."
Some companies respond by creating a norm against public discussion
of salaries, on the theory that people are likely to be happy enough
with their own, but would be less happy if they found themselves mak-
87 Idat 180.
88 For a recent, detailed treatment, see Bewley, Why Wages Don't Fall during a Recession at
.310 (cited in note 82).
89 Id. The point may be most familiar in professional sports, where athletes seek higher
salaries on the basis of the salary set by relevant others. Often such athletes contend that their
demands are not really "about money," but are really "about respect." These claims are fre-
quently ridiculed on the ground that "respect" is a disguise for what really matters, which is "the
money." If we are right, there is no disguise here; money is a proxy for "respect." Labor market
behavior shows that this is a pervasive phenomenon, not limited to professional sports. (Imagine
if you discovered that the median salary in your workplace, for people like you, was 5 percent
higher than your salary.)
90 Id at 81.
91 Id at 80.
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ing comparisons to others.2 Strategies of this sort would be attractive
to firms whose workers care about relative position.
3. The ultimatum game.
Concern about relative wealth also helps to explain some other-
wise puzzling behavior in interpersonal bargaining contexts. Consider,
for example, an elegant experiment known as the "ultimatum game.""9
The game is played by two players, "Proposer" and "Responder." It
begins with Proposer being given a sum of money (say, $100) that he
must then propose how to divide between himself and Responder.
Responder then has two options: (1) he can accept, in which case each
party gets the amount proposed; or (2) he can refuse, in which case
each party gets zero and the $100 goes back to the experimenter.
If Proposer believes that Responder cares only about absolute
wealth, his own wealth-maximizing strategy is clear: he should propose
$99 for himself and $1 for Responder (supposing that only integer dol-
lar amounts are allowed). If Proposer's assumption about Responder
is correct, Responder will accept this one-sided offer because he will
reason that getting $1 is better than getting nothing. This is the stan-
dard economic prediction.
But suppose that Responder cares not only about absolute but
also about relative wealth levels-about he relative division of money
between the two players. Responder might then refuse the one-sided
offer, even though he stands to gain from it in absolute terms, because
he finds the relative terms so distasteful. In fact, refusals of one-sided
offers are widely observed. Responders routinely reject offers that do
not involve splits of 50-50 or 60-40-even when the stakes are large, as
in games played for more than a week's salary in poor nations." Likely
92 This happens to be the practice within the faculty of the University of Chicago Law
School; there is an exceptionally strong norm against public discussion of salaries, even among
good friends. The evident basis of the norm is to prevent dissatisfaction about relative position in
the face of satisfaction with absolute position.
93 For a general discussion of ultimatum games, see Werner Guth, Rolf Schmittberger, and
Bernd Schwarze, An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J Econ Beh & Org 367
(1982).
94 See, for example, Robert Slonim and Alvin E. Roth, Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum
Games:An Experiment in the Slovak Republic, 66 Econometrica 569,571,573-75 (1998) (finding
that Slovakian Responders rejected offers in high stakes games roughly as often as in low stakes
games. The experimenters did find, however, that repeat players modified their behaviors as they
gained experience-with Responders accepting more frequently and Proposers making lower of-
fers, particularly in high stakes situations.); Colin Camerer and Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Ul-
timatums, Dictators and Manners, 9 J Econ Persp 209,211 (Spring 1995) (noting inelasticity of re-
jection threshold even as dollar amounts went from $10 to $100); Alvin E. Roth, et al, Bargaining
and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo:An Experimental Study, 81
Am Econ Rev 1068, 1091-94 (1991) (finding consistent rejection of offers under 50 percent
across cultures).
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anticipating Responders' behavior, Proposers routinely offer splits of
50-50 and 60-40. Proposers rarely offer less than 20 percent, and Re-
sponders rarely accept less than that amount. The existence of such re-
sults in games with large stakes demonstrates that the outcomes can-
not be discounted on the ground that the money involved is a small
fraction of total wealth.
To be sure, relative position is not all that matters in the ultima-
tum game. Much of the behavior is driven by Responders' beliefs
about the motivations of Proposers. When the experiment is altered to
make it seem as if Proposers have earned the right to be Proposers,
more unequal divisions are acceptable; the same is true when Propos-
ers' options are narrowed, making an unequal division (say, 80-20)
seem more fair in light of the alternatives (say, 90-10 or 10-90)." Thus a
preference for good relative position does not explain all of what oc-
curs in the game; ensuring a fair outcome, which may or may not call
for good relative position, is often the driving factor. But relative posi-
tion also counts for many participants, so much so that "difference
aversion" appears to motivate a significant percentage of partici-
pants." That is enough for our basic claim here.
An obvious irony is that the effect of Proposer's belief that Re-
sponder cares about relative wealth is to boost substantially the
amount that Proposer offers Responder. By virtue of his concern
about relative wealth, Responder becomes a much more effective
bargainer. Thus the outcomes of the ultimatum game strongly support
the proposition that relative income, not only absolute income, mat-
ters a great deal," and indeed that this concern for relative position
can strengthen bargaining positions.
95 See Camerer and Thaler, 9 J Econ Persp at 215-16 (cited in note 94).
96 See Gary Charness and Matthew Rabin, Social Preferences: Some Simple Tests and a
New Model, U Pompeu Fabra, Econ & Bus Working Paper No 441 at 39-40 (Social Science Re-
search Network 2000), available online at <http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?ABSTRACrID=
224577> (visited November 13,2000) (finding difference aversion a factor in over 80 percent of
games studied).
97 As noted in the text, we do not contend that the outcomes of the ultimatum game can be
explained solely on this basis. Responder's perception of Proposer's intentions, and character, is
an important factor in these experiments. For instructive treatments, see Camerer and Thaler, 9 J
Econ Persp at 216 (cited in note 94) (finding that a sense of "manners" influences offers and ac-
ceptances); Sally Blount, When Social Outcomes Aren't Fair: The Effect of Causal Attributions on
Preferences, 63 Org Beh & Hum Dec Processes 131, 139-43 (August 1995) (finding that Re-
sponders' decisions to accept or reject an offer are based, in part, on a desire to punish rude of-
fers and not punish offers made by a disinterested third party); Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr, and Urs
Fischbacher, Testing Theories of Fairness- Intentions Matter, Institute for Empirical Research in
Economics, Univ of Zurich Working Paper No 63 at 16 (Sept 2000), available online at
http:/www.unizh.chllew/up/s (visited Jan 16, 2001) (finding that intentions, and not simply mate-
rial distributions, matter in bargaining games).
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4. Status experiments.
Sheryl Ball and her coauthors have shown that even simple labo-
ratory manipulations of relative position can have profound implica-
tions for the terms of market exchange." In one experiment, for ex-
ample, they awarded half of their subjects "stars" on the basis of their
performance on a transparently meaningless quiz. " Following these
awards, subjects were given objects of known value and allowed to ex-
change these objects with one another for cash.' ° The subjects who re-
ceived stars consistently received better terms-that is, they bought at
lower prices and sold at higher prices-when they exchanged goods
with subjects who did not receive stars.'0 ' It seems clear that people
with higher relative position in a salient context do better in appar-
ently unrelated contexts, simply because of that higher position.
C. Biological and Physiological Evidence
There is evidence that relative position affects health and even
fundamental biochemical processes in the nervous system. For reasons
that remain poorly understood, and are not easily traced to a simple
causal mechanism, high relative position is correlated with good
health, and low relative position with worse health-holding absolute
income constant.1°
In a study involving groups of adult vervet monkeys, Raleigh, et
al found a relevant mechanism for the correlation of status to health:
the dominant member in each group had substantially higher concen-
trations of the neurotransmitter serotonin, which affects mood and
behavior in a variety of ways."' They also showed that this difference
was both a cause and an effect of high status." The evidence is not lim-
98 Sheryl Ball, Catherine Eckel, Philip Grossman, and William Zame, Status in Markets, 0 J
Econ (forthcoming 2001); Sheryl Ball and Catherine Eckel, The Economic Value of Status, 27 J
Socio-Econ 495 (1998); Sheryl Ball and Catherine Eckel, Buying Status: Experimental Evidence
on Status in Negotiations, 13 Psych and Marketing 381 (1996).
99 Ball and Eckel, 13 Psych and Marketing at 387-89.
100 Id.
101 Id at 389-90.
102 See Robert H. Frank, Luxury Fever: Why Money Fails to Satisfy in an Era of Excess 142-
43 (Free Press 1999).
103 See Michael J. Raleigh, et al, Social and Environmental Influence on Blood Serotonin
Concentrations in Monkeys, 41 Archives Gen Psych 405,406-08 (1984) (finding dominant male
serotonin levels at approximately 1000 ng/mL mean concentration versus approximately 650
ng/mL in subordinate males).
104 To do this, they removed the initially dominant animal from each group and placed him
in an isolation cage. Id at 407-08. Shortly thereafter, a new individual established dominance
within each group, and after roughly seventy-two hours passed, serotonin concentrations in the
newly dominant animal rose to the levels seen in the formerly dominant animal. Id. At the same
time, the serotonin concentrations in the formerly dominant animal fell to the level associated
with subordinate status. Id. When the initially dominant animal was returned to the group, he re-
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ited to monkeys; McGuire and his colleagues have also found elevated
serotonin levels in the leaders of college fraternities and athletic
teams." In another study, Douglas Madsen finds that the status-
serotonin relationship is positive for some groups of male college stu-
dents.'
Like dopamine, norepinephrine, and other neurotransmitters, se-
rotonin affects mood and behavior in a variety of ways. Within limits,
having elevated serotonin concentrations is associated with enhanced
feelings of well-being. Serotonin deficiencies are associated with a va-
riety of affective disorders, including irritability, sleep disorders, mania,
and depression.'07 Recent work suggests that serotonin deficiencies are
also strongly linked with impulsive aggression and suicide attempts."
In males, concentrations of the sex hormone testosterone appear
to have a relationship with status similar to the one seen for serotonin.
Reductions in status thus tend to be followed by reductions in plasma
testosterone levels, whereas these levels tend to rise following in-
creases in status.' A player who wins a tennis match decisively, for ex-
ample, experiences a post-match elevation in plasma testosterone, and
his vanquished opponent experiences a post-match reduction." And
as with serotonin, there is some evidence from primate studies that
elevated concentrations of testosterone facilitate behaviors that help
achieve or maintain high status."
asserted dominance and serotonin concentrations in both the originally dominant and interim
dominant animals responded accordingly. Id.
105 Michael T. McGuire, personal communication to Robert Frank (1998).
106 Douglas Madsen, Serotonin and Social Rank among Human Males, in Roger D. Masters
and Michael T. McGuire, eds, The Neurotransmitter Revolution: Serotonin, Social Behavior, and
the Law 146, 146-58 (Southern Illinois 1994).
107 See Alec Coppen, Role of Serotonin in Affective Disorders, in Jack Barchas and Earl Us-
din, eds, Serotonin and Behavior 523, 523-27 (Academic 1973); Morris A. Lipton, Summary of
Serotonin and Behavior Conference, in Barchas and Usdin, eds, Serotonin and Behavior 565, 567.
108 Emil F. Coccaro and Brian McNamee, The Biology ofAggression: Relevance to Crime, in
Andrew E. Skodol, ed, Psychopathology and Violent Crime 99,107 (APA 1998) (noting that sero-
tonin levels are reported low in "violent offenders with a personal history of suicide attempt[s]").
The drug Prozac, widely prescribed for depression and other mood disorders, is a serotonin up-
take inhibitor, which means that it increases the effective concentrations of serotonin in the
brain.
109 See, for example, Allen Mazur, Physiology, Dominance, and Aggression in Humans, in
Arnold P. Goldstein, ed, Prevention and Control of Aggression 145, 150 (Pergamon 1983); Allen
Mazur and Theodore A. Lamb, Testosterone, Status, and Mood in Human Males, 14 Hormones &
Beh 236, 244-45 (1980) (finding rise in testosterone levels at various times following personal
triumphs); Michael Elias, Serum Cortisol, Testosterone and Testosterone-Binding Globulin Re-
sponses to Competitive Fighting in Human Males, 7 Aggressive Beh 215, 221 (1981) (noting
greater increases in testosterone levels for winners of wrestling matches versus losers).
110 Mazur and Lamb, 14 Hormones & Beh at 239-40 (cited in note 109).
111 See, for example, Robert M. Rose, Irwin S. Bernstein, and Thomas P. Gordon, Conse-
quences of Social Conflict on Plasma Testosterone Levels in Rhesus Monkeys, 37 Psychosomatic
Med 50, 57 (1975) (finding that newly defeated and subordinated rhesus monkeys experienced
drops in plasma testosterone concentrations).
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To be sure, it is not simple to extrapolate from such data to judg-
ments about the importance of relative position with respect to in-
come (and other goods) within all human contexts and societies; so-
cialization matters a great deal and can undoubtedly increase or de-
crease people's concern with their standing in the group. But there is
at least plausible reason to think that a high relative position is associ-
ated with desirable physiological effects, and that low relative position
is associated with undesirable ones.
Two extended studies of British civil servants even find a link be-
tween relative income and disease.'2 These studies, with large samples,
find that higher relative ranks on employment mean better health and
lower risks of death. Relative position, not absolute wealth, appears to
have significant consequences for mortality and morbidity.
There are more speculative grounds to think that relative posi-
tion is important. If we adopt the biologist's view that human motiva-
tion is shaped in part by the forces of natural selection, it is no surprise
that people would care so strongly about relative resource holdings.
Even in a famine, for example, there is always some food available,
and the question of who gets it is settled largely by relative entitle-
ments." ' Concern about relative position is also adaptive insofar as it
prods people to monitor how they are doing relative to thdir competi-
tors and to boost their effort levels if they start falling behind.'
In sum, evidence from several disciplines strongly suggests that
interpersonal comparisons are an important determinant of both
physical and psychological well-being. Such comparisons take place
along many dimensions other than income. In what follows, however,
our focus will be on comparisons in the income domain. We emphasize
income comparisons because relative economic position is of obvious
importance and because positional concerns typically loom larger with
income than with the goods that regulation attempts to provide
(safety, leisure time, leave to take care of children and ailing relatives).
Our basic objection is that the conventional estimates used in cost-
benefit analysis of health and safety regulation are derived from mod-
els that assume, quite implausibly, that people do not care at all about
relative economic position. This produces a serious distortion, as we
shall now see.
112 See Michael G. Marmot, Martin Bobak, and George Davey Smith, Explanations for So-
cial Inequalities in Health, in Benjamin C. Amick III, et al, eds, Society and Health 172, 173 (Ox-
ford 1995).
113 See Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines:An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (Ox-
ford 1981).
114 The alternative of operating at maximum effort levels at all times is less efficient in that
people tend to do better by conserving their energy when environmental conditions are not
stressful, for use at times when the threats to survival are more immediate;
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III. How CONCERNS ABOUT RELATIVE POSITION AFFECT
WILLINGNESS TO PAY
There is an initial question about the use of willingness to pay as
a measure for many regulatory benefits: Who is actually going to pay
for them? Suppose, for example, that government proposes to impose
workplace safety requirements or to require all employers to provide
a certain period of leave time for new parents. Will the cost of these
requirements be borne by (a) workers, in the form of reduced salary
(or other benefits); or (b) consumers, in the form of increased prices;
or (c) firms, in the form of reduced profits (and perhaps reduced com-
pensation for high-level executives); or (d) the unemployed, in the
form of lost job opportunities?
Though theoretical considerations can provide useful guidance,"5
this is, of course, an empirical question; and as a general rule, decisive
empirical evidence is lacking. There is, however, evidence that at least
in some cases, requirements of this sort do result in lower wages. The
workers' compensation programs of the early twentieth century, for
example, appear to have resulted in something like a dollar-for-dollar
reduction in the earnings of nonunionized workers; the parental leave
program of the early 1990s appears to have had a similar effect."
' For
the sake of discussion, we make a simple assumption here, without in-
sisting that the assumption is correct: The people who benefit from
regulatory programs will also have to pay for those benefits. We sug-
gest that even if they do have to pay for those benefits, existing meth-
ods for eliciting their willingness to pay substantially understate the
appropriate amount, from the beneficiary's own point of view.
A. The Distortion
1. Smith and Jones.
To illustrate how concerns about relative position affect willing-
ness to pay for an amenity such as workplace safety, we begin by
working through a simple, stylized example of an employment deci-
sion confronting two workers: Smith and Jones. For simplicity's sake,
115 For an overview of the theoretical considerations, see Lawrence H. Summers, Some
Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 Am Econ Rev 177 (May 1989). A helpful recent dis-
cussion is Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 99 Stan L Rev 223 (2000).
116 See Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, 84 Am Econ Rev
622, 623 (1994) (finding that the cost of federally mandated maternity health insurance has been
shifted to salaries of those benefiting); Price V. Fishback and Shawn Everett Kantor, Did Workers
Pay for the Passage of Workers' Compensation Laws?, 110 Q J Econ 713,736 (1995) ("Analysis of
the effect of the introduction of workers' compensation on wages shows that in the coal and
lumber industries, workers experienced substantial wage offsets. In the coal industry the offsets
were large enough to cover not only the expected monetary value of the benefits, but also the
employers' costs of purchasing the insurance to provide those benefits.").
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we assume that each gets satisfaction from, or cares about, three
things: his income, his safety on the job, and his position on the eco-
nomic ladder. We make no assumptions about why he cares about that
position, though we will say a few words on the point below. The
choice the two confront is between a safe job that pays $300/week and
a risky job that pays $350/week. The value of safety to each is
$100/week, and each evaluates relative income as follows: Having
more income than his neighbor provides the equivalent of $100/week
worth of additional satisfaction; having less income than his neighbor
means the equivalent of a $100/week reduction in satisfaction; and
having the same income as his neighbor means no change in the un-
derlying level of satisfaction. (For purposes of understanding the gen-
eral point, the specific numbers do not matter; the same point could
be illustrated in any number of ways.) The question is: Which jobs will
Smith and Jones choose?
If we viewed each person's decision in isolation, the normatively
correct choice would be the safe job. Although it pays $50/week less
than the risky job, the extra safety it provides is worth $100/week, by
assumption. So if we ignore concerns about relative income, the value
of the safe job is $400/week (its $300 salary plus $100 worth of safety),
which is $50/week more than the $350 value of the risky job.
Once we incorporate concerns about relative income, however,
the logic of the decision changes in a fundamental way. Now the at-
tractiveness of each choice depends on the job chosen by the other.
The four possible combinations of choices and the corresponding lev-
els of satisfaction are shown in Table 3.
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TABLE 3
THE EFFECT OF CONCERNS ABOUT RELATIVE INCOME ON
WORKER CHOICES REGARDING SAFETY
Smith
safe job unsafe job
@ $300/wk @ $350/wk
safe job $400/wk each $300/wk for Jones




Suppose, for example, that Jones chooses the safe job. If Smith
then chooses the unsafe job, he ends up with total satisfaction worth
$450-$350 in salary plus $100 from having more income than Jones.
Jones, for his part, ends up with only $300 worth of total satisfaction -
$300 in salary plus $100 from safety minus $100 from having a lower
income than Smith. Alternatively, suppose Jones chooses the unsafe
job. Then Smith again does better to accept the unsafe job, for by so
doing he gets $350 worth of satisfaction rather than only $300. Since
the payoff matrix is symmetric, each player's dominant strategy is to
choose the unsafe job.
Armed with the standard theory of revealed preference, an ana-
lyst who observed these choices would conclude that Smith and Jones
must value the extra safety at less than $50/week. After all, they could
have chosen the safe job by sacrificing only $50/week in wages, yet
they chose not to do so. Their choices do not imply, however, that each
values safety at less than $100/week. Note that if each chooses a safe
job, each will get $400 worth of total satisfaction-$300 of income,
$100 worth of satisfaction from safety, and zero satisfaction from rela-
tive position. If each instead chooses the unsafe job, each would have
$350 of total satisfaction-$350 of income, zero satisfaction from




Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position
satisfaction from a higher or lower relative position. If we compare
the upper-left cell of Table 3 to the lower-right cell, then we can say
unequivocally that Smith and Jones would be happier if each took a
safe job at lower income than if each chose an unsafe job with more
income. By assumption, the extra safety is worth more ($100) than its
cost ($50).
The discrepancy arises from a standard problem: the job-safety
choice confronts workers with a prisoner's dilemma. If our two work-
ers could choose collectively and thus ensure against defection, they
would pick the safe job, an outcome they prefer to what happens when
they choose independently.
The bias against safety illustrated in this example stems from our
assumption that well-being depends on relative income but not on
relative safety. In practice, however, relative safety levels may also
matter, since a given risk in the workplace is likely to seem less objec-
tionable in environments in which other similar risks are common. A
bias against workplace safety would nonetheless result if concerns
about relative income were greater, on average, than concerns about
relative safety. Such a difference would be expected on grounds that
interpersonal safety comparisons are often precluded by the fact that
safety levels are difficult to observe. Such a difference might also be
justified if, as seems plausible, safety, far more than income, is by its
nature a good whose value depends largely, though of course not only,
on absolute value. What we will be suggesting here is that many regu-
latory goods are less positional than income, both because they are
less easily observed and because people care about them more or less
independently of what others have or do. For some such goods, the in-
tuition here should be especially clear. The opportunity to spend time
with an infant, for example, retains much of its value regardless of how
many other people have that opportunity.
2. The real world.
In practice, workers must choose among many jobs, each with a
different wage and level of workplace safety. As in the example just
considered, concerns about relative position in this more realistic set-
ting will cause workers to choose jobs that offer higher wages and
lower safety levels than they would have chosen in the absence of
concerns about relative position.' From the individual worker's van-
tage point, the higher wages that accompany riskier jobs promise an
improvement in both absolute and relative consumption. Yet when
117 For simplicity, we are assuming here that the reference group consists of workers in the
same firms; of course, people are not so limited in their reference groups. We discuss some com-
plications below.
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other workers make similar choices, the relative advance each hoped
to achieve does not materialize. The incentive problem is analogous to
the familiar stadium metaphor: all stand up to get a better view, yet no
one sees any better than if all had remained seated.
The upshot is that conventional measures of willingness to pay
understate the social benefits of additional workplace safety. In typical
applications, cost-benefit analysts estimate the value of workplace
safety by means of hedonic pricing models, which examine how wages
vary with workplace injury levels or mortality rates."8 For example, a
hedonic pricing model might estimate that, after controlling for other
relevant factors, wages fall by 2 percent when the probability of dying
in a workplace accident falls by one in a thousand. Analysts would in-
fer from such an estimate that a worker earning $50,000 per year
would be would be willing to pay $1000 per year for a 0.001 reduction
in the probability of death. From that price they would then extrapo-
late that the statistical value of a human life is $1,000/0.001 = $1 mil-
lion.
But this procedure understates the social value of risk reduction.
What the hedonic pricing model really tells us is that a $50,000-a-year
worker would pay $1,000 for a 0.001 reduction in the probability of
dying, even though the expenditure would reduce his consumption sig-
nificantly relative to those who did not make similar expenditures on
safety. The implication is that if the worker cares about relative posi-
tion, he would be willing to pay more than $1,000 for the additional
safety if the transaction did not entail a reduction in relative consump-
tion (as would be true if all workers bought additional safety).
B. Removing the Distortion: The Elasticity of Position and a
Simple Solution
What has been said thus far is sufficient to show that there is a
distortion; but it has not established the size of that distortion. How
big is it, and how might a cost-benefit analyst attempt to correct for it?
To answer these questions, we need to know how much an individual's
own income would have to increase in order to compensate fully for
any negative effects caused by a general rise in the incomes of others.
More precisely, we define the elasticity of position as the percentage
by which an individual's own income would have to rise in order to
compensate fully for the effects of a 1 percent rise in the incomes of
others in his social comparison set. For example, if an individual would
be indifferent between the status quo and a change in which his in-
118 See Thaler and Rosen, The Value of Saving a Life at 292-97 (cited in note 9) (estimating
marginal valuations of safety at $176-$260 for a reduction of 0.1 percent in chance of death).
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come rose 0.5 percent while others' incomes rose 1 percent, the elas-
ticity of position would be 0.5.
One way to try to estimate the elasticity of position is to employ
results from surveys in which subjects are periodically asked questions
such as "What is the smallest amount of money a family of four needs
to get along in this community?""' In one series of surveys, the median
response to this question-expressed as a percentage of the current
year's average disposable income for a family of four-varied be-
tween 52 percent and 33 percent, with little discernable trend.2' Simi-
lar patterns have been found in other surveys. For example, Eugene
Smolensky found that the median values of reported estimates of
"minimum-comfort" budgets for workers in New York City have hov-
ered around half of average per capita national income since the be-
ginning of the twentieth century.12' Lee Rainwater found that for sur-
veys taken between 1950 and 1986, the "income necessary to get
along" had grown at about the same rate as per capita national in-
come.
These findings suggest that the elasticity of position is 1.0-or
that an individual's income would have to grow in the same propor-
tion as overall income to maintain a constant level of subjective well-
being. To say that the elasticity of position is 1.0 amounts to saying
that relative income is the only important economic determinant of
subjective well-being. Although this conclusion is broadly consistent
with the survey evidence reviewed by Richard Easterlin,'22 it is clearly
an extreme position. If we accept this conclusion at face value, the im-
plication is that safety and other less positional or nonpositional regu-
latory benefits can be provided essentially for free!
For the reasons earlier discussed, however, we reject the conclu-
sion that only relative income matters, and indeed other survey evi-
dence appears to suggest an elasticity of position significantly less
than 1.0. The most conservative estimate we could find comes from a
study by three Dutch economists. Using data collected in the Nether-
lands, van de Stadt, Kapteyn, and van de Geer ("vKv") estimate an
elasticity of position equal to roughly one-third -that is, that a family
would need about a 3.3 percent increase in its real income to compen-
sate for a 10 percent increase in the incomes of all others in the com-
119 Benjamin Friedman, The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth (Random House
forthcoming 2001).
120 Id.
121 Eugene Smolensky, The Past and Present Poor, in Task Force on Economic Growth and
Opportunity, ed, The Concept of Poverty 35,45 (U.S. Chamber of Commerce 1965).
122 See Lee Rainwater, Poverty and Equivalence as Social Constructions, No 91-1 Luxem-
bourg Income Study 5-10 (CEPS/INSTEAD and Harvard Department of Sociology 1990).
123 See Easterlin, Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? at 99-104 (cited in note
57) (finding little change in happiness over time).
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munity. For illustrative purposes, we employ this estimate to con-
struct a simple multiplier for adjusting willingness to pay values gen-
erated by hedonic pricing models.
Consider a hypothetical world in which each individual works as
an independent contractor and must decide how to apportion his in-
come between safety and other goods. Suppose that in this world we
observe that individual workers are willing to give up 2 percent of
their incomes each year in exchange for a .001 reduction in the prob-
ability of dying in a workplace accident. A worker earning $50,000 per
year would thus be willing to pay $1,000 per year for the additional
safety, even though the expenditure would entail a 2 percent reduction
in his relative standard of living. The vKv estimate suggests that this
worker would be willing to pay roughly $333 more for the same in-
crement in safety if he could be assured that his relative income would
be unaffected by the expenditure -as would be the case, for example,
if everyone else made similar expenditures on safety. For the hypo-
thetical world described, an adjustment based on the vKv survey data
would thus call for an upward revision by 33 percent in the willingness
to pay values inferred from hedonic pricing models. For example, if
those models produced a value of life of $5 million, the right number
would be closer to $6.7 million-a substantial difference, to say the
least, for purposes of regulatory law.
In practice, of course, most workers do not decide as independent
contractors how much to spend on safety. Typically, they work in firms
in which the level of safety expenditure is the same for each worker in
a given occupation. In such environments, joining a group with high
expenditures on safety does not entail a loss of relative income vis-A-
vis coworkers (although it does still mean having lower income rela-
tive to members of other groups). If one's personal reference group
consisted entirely of one's coworkers, the distortion caused by con-
cerns about relative position would not arise, and conventional he-
donic estimates would not be biased. Typically, however, an individ-
ual's personal reference group contains not just coworkers, but also
friends, neighbors, family members, and other acquaintances who are
not in a position to participate in collective decisions about safety ex-
penditures.
For the sake of illustration, we consider the intermediate case of a
worker whose personal reference group consists equally of coworkers
124 See Huib van de Stadt, Arie Kapteyn, and Sara van de Geer, The Relativity of Utility:
Evidence from Panel Data, 67 Rev Econ & Statistics 179, 185 (1985) (determining that the rela-
tive weight assigned to other people's incomes in calculating an individual's welfare function of
income is approximately 0.3). See also Bernard M.S. van Praag and Arie Kapteyn, Further Evi-
dence on the Individual Welfare Function of Income: An Empirical Investigation in the Nether-
lands, 4 Eur Econ Rev 33 (1973).
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and non-coworkers. For such a worker earning $50,000 per year, a
$1,000 per year expenditure on safety reduces relative income by an
average of 1 percent (a zero percent reduction vis-A-vis his coworkers
and a 2 percent reduction vis-A-vis others). Our adjustment based on
the vKv estimate would then be only half as large as before. That is,
the worker would be willing to pay roughly $167 more for the same
increment in safety if he could be assured that his income relative to
relevant non-coworkers would be unaffected by the expenditure-as
would be the case, again, if everyone else made similar expenditures
on safety. For this illustrative case, an adjustment based on the vKv
survey data would call for an upward revision by 17 percent in the
willingness to pay values inferred from hedonic pricing models. For
example, if those models produced a value of life of $5 million, the ad-
justed estimate would be almost $6 million.
C. An Alternative Approach
1. An overview.
Many analysts may feel uncomfortable adjusting benefit esti-
mates on the basis of responses to survey questions regarding subjec-
tive well-being. In this section we examine an alternative procedure
that rests not on surveys but on objective market data-on what be-
havior within markets reveals about people's value of higher rank, or
elasticity of position. If people care about relative position not just in
a global sense, but also within the context of specific groups to which
they belong, it is possible to infer the value of relative income by ex-
amining the relationship between wages, local rank, and productivity
among groups of coworkers."'
The full story is somewhat technical. For those uninterested in the
details, the simple version begins with the suggestion that in the labor
market, compensating wage differentials must be and are paid, not
only for higher risks26 and less vacation time, but also for lower rela-
tive positions within firms.27 Just as in the context of risk-taking, where
the use of compensating wage differentials is well-established,'s so too
here. Actual labor market behavior can be used to ascertain the
125 See, for example, Robert H. Frank, Are Workers Paid their Marginal Products?, 74 Am
Econ Rev 549,569-70 (1984) (determining that more productive workers are paid less than their
marginal products while less productive workers are paid more than their marginal products, im-
plying that workers care about their relative incomes amongst coworkers).
126 See Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs at 34-41 (cited in note 7).
127 Of course different people will have different tastes on this count, as we discuss; some
people do not much care about a high relative position, and some people even dislike having
much more income than their coworkers. We use survey and labor market evidence to capture
aggregates.
128 See Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs at 34-41 (cited in note 7).
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amount that people are willing to pay to avoid occupying positions of
low rank vis-A-vis their coworkers. Compensating wage differentials,
once ascertained, can be used to adjust private willingness to pay by
incorporating concerns about relative position. We attempt an exer-
cise to show how such differentials might be calculated, with the quali-
fication that a full analysis would require access to fuller and more up-
to-date labor market data than those used here. What is important is
the principle and the basic inquiry, not the details.
2. In general: how rank affects labor market choices.
Standard labor market theories, which assume that workers do
not care about relative position, assert that wage rates will track pro-
ductivity differences on a one-to-one basis. Thus if one worker con-
tributes $10/hour more than another to the employer's bottom line,
the first worker should earn precisely $10/hour mor& than the second.
Yet many firms follow strict salary formulas based on experience, edu-
cation, and length of tenure within the firm, even when there are large
visible differences in the productivity of workers paid the same under
these formulas.
Such patterns can be accounted for, however, by a simple
amendment o the standard models. The amendment rests on two as-
sumptions: (1) other things being equal, most people prefer high-
ranked to low-ranked positions among their coworkers; and (2) no
one can be forced to remain in a firm against his or her wishes.29
Our account begins with the observation that, by the laws of sim-
ple arithmetic, not everyone's preference for high rank in the wage
distribution of his firm can be satisfied. After all, only 50 percent of
the members of any group can be in the top half. But if people are free
to associate with whomever they please, why are the lesser-ranked
members of groups content to remain? Why don't they all leave and
attempt to form new groups of their own in which they would no
longer be near the bottom? Many workers undoubtedly do precisely
that. And yet we also observe many stable, heterogeneous groups. Not
all accountants at General Motors are equally talented; and in every
law firm, some partners attract much more new business than others.
If everyone prefers to be near the top of his or her group of cowork-
ers, what holds these heterogeneous groups together?
An important part of the answer is that their low-ranked mem-
bers receive extra compensation-partly from a prestigious associa-
129 For a formalization of the argument that follows, see Robert H. Frank, Interdependent
Preferences and the Competitive Wage Structure, 15 RAND J Econ 510,510-20 (1984) (modeling
an equilibrium wage structure that reflects the narrow distribution of incomes among workers
who care about relative income and are free to choose their coworkers).
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tion, partly from an advantageous wage structure. If they were to
leave, they would gain by no longer having to endure low rank. By the
same token, however, the top-ranked members would lose, because
they would no longer enjoy high rank. If their gains from having high
rank are larger than the costs borne by members with low rank, it
does not make sense for the group to disband. Everyone can do better
if the top-ranked workers induce their lesser-ranked colleagues to re-
main by sharing some of their pay with them.
Of course, not everyone assigns the same value to having high
rank. Some people care little or not at all about high relative rank.
Some people actually dislike having more money, or a lot more
money, than their coworkers. Others consider high relative rank ex-
tremely important. Some people do not care much about high rank,
but abhor low rank. Just as people diverge on other aspects of a com-
pensation package, such as parental leave and vacation time, so too
they diverge on the value of a high relative rank. Those who care little
or less about high rank will do best to join firms in which the wage is
high even if, or because, they are less productive than most workers on
the scene. As lesser-ranked members in these firms, they will receive
extra compensation. People who care most strongly about rank, by
contrast, will want to join firms in which most other workers are less
productive than themselves. For the privilege of occupying top-ranked
positions in those firms, they will have to work for less than the value
of what they produce.
Workers can thus sort themselves among a hierarchy of firms in
accordance with their demands for within-firm status. Figure 1 depicts
the menu of choices confronting workers whose productivity takes a
given value, M. The heavy lines represent the wage schedules offered
by three different firms. They tell how much a worker with a given
productivity would be paid in each firm. The average productivity
level is highest in firm 3, next highest in firm 2, and lowest in firm 1.
The problem facing persons with productivity level M0 is to choose
which of these three firms to work for.
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FIGURE 1





Workers who care most about local rank will want to "purchase"
high-ranked positions such as the one labeled "A" in Firm 1. In such
positions, they work for less than the value of what they produce. By
contrast, those who care least about local rank will elect to receive
wage premiums (of one or another magnitude) by working in low-
ranked positions such as the one labeled "C" in Firm 3. Workers with
moderate concerns about local rank will be attracted to intermediate
positions such as the one labeled "B" in Firm 2, for which they neither
pay nor receive any compensation for local rank.
Note also in Figure 1 that even though not every worker in each
firm is paid the value of what he or she produces, workers taken as a
group nonetheless do receive the value of what they produce. The ex-
tra compensation received by each firm's low-ranked workers is ex-
actly offset by the shortfall in pay of its high-ranked workers. There is
thus an implicit market for high-ranked positions in the firm. Buyers
in this market are those who purchase the right to occupy such posi-
tions by agreeing to work for less than the value of what they produce.
Sellers in this market are those who agree to occupy low-ranked posi-
tions (without which high-ranked positions cannot exist) in return for
being paid more than the value of what they produce. By observing
the deviations between pay and productivity within groups of workers
in the firm, the analyst can infer the monetary value that people assign
to high local rank.
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3. Compensating differentials for relatively lower rank.
How large are the compensating wage differentials for lower
rank within the firm? If we knew the answer to that question, we
could use it in an attempt to estimate the monetary cost of a reduction
in relative position-the essential piece of information we need to ad-
just conventional estimates of the monetary value of safety and other
workplace amenities. Of course, the amount that workers are willing
to pay for high local rank will be different for different occupations. In
occupations in which coworkers do not associate closely with one an-
other, people will not be willing to pay much for a high-ranked posi-
tion. After all, the comparisons that matter most are those between
people who interact most intensively. The price paid for high rank
(and received for low rank) will be highest in occupations in which
coworkers work closely together for extended periods.
The amended model predicts that the wage will rise by less than a
dollar for each extra dollar of value produced, and that the difference
between productivity and pay will increase with the extensiveness of
interaction between coworkers.' The predictions of the standard
model are contrasted with those of the amended model in Figure 2.
130 Of course, factors other than an implicit market for local rank might also contribute to
wage compression within firms. Frans Spinnewyn, Long Term Contracts and Income Redistribu-
tion, CORE Discussion Paper No 8357 (Center for Operations Research & Econometrics and
Catholic University, Leuven 1983), for example, notes that if workers are risk averse and initially
uncertain about how productive they are, they can benefit by agreeing ex ante to have greater
cross-sectional wage equality within each work group than would be called for by the variations
in productivity that are revealed ex post. Perhaps, but that seems an unlikely explanation for the
wage compression observed in the entries of Table 4, because for these occupations existing la-
bor contracts cannot prevent the most productive workers from being bid away by rival employ-
ers once productivity differences are revealed.
Measurement difficulties might also lead to wage compression, because a firm's wages can-
not be expected to track productivity differences that cannot be observed. But this too seems an
unlikely explanation for the wage compression observed in Table 4. Individual differences in
productivity among salespersons are relatively easy to observe, and the estimate reported for re-
search chemists is based on one component of productivity-long-term contributions to over-
head cost recovery from research grants-that can be measured with precision.
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FIGURE 2
WAGE SCHEDULES AND THE INTENSITY OF INTERACTION
Wage Wage = Productivity (standard model)
with less intensive interaction
[ rank model with more intensive interaction
Productivity
Table 4 presents estimates of the rates at which earnings rise with
productivity for three occupations."' The occupations are listed in in-
creasing order of closeness of interaction. Real estate salespersons,
who have the least intensive contact, pay the lowest amounts for high-
ranked positions. At the other end of the spectrum, research chemists,
who work together in close-knit groups for extended periods, pay very
large sums indeed. In the sample studied, the most productive chem-
ists accounted for over $200,000 more in revenues each year than their
least productive colleagues, yet received only slightly higher salaries.'3 2
Auto salespersons do not associate nearly as intensively as chemists,
but unlike real estate salespersons, they do spend their working hours
together in the same location. And as predicted, the price of high-
ranked positions for auto salespersons lies between those of the other
two occupations.'33
131 Frank, 74 Am Econ Rev at 555-64 (cited in note 125).
132 Id at 559-64.
133 Id at 555-56.
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TABLE 4
PAY VS. PRODUCTIVITY FOR THREE OCCUPATIONS" 3
Extra Earnings per Extra Dollar of Productivity
Occupation Actual Predicted by Standard Model
Real estate sales $0.70 $1
Auto sales $0.24 $1
Research chemists < $0.09 $1
4. Calculating the proper multiplier.
We propose the following procedure for generating an estimate
of the lower bound of the extent to which concerns about local rank
contribute to wage compression. (That number will then serve as the
basis for our estimate of the extent to which concerns about relative
position reduce willingness to pay for safety and other amenities.) We
start with the assumption that real estate agents assign no value at all
to their income rank vis-A-vis coworkers. This is an exaggeration, to be
sure, but perhaps not a serious one in light of the fact that agents
spend relatively little time in one another's company. Since real estate
agents' earnings grow by seventy cents for every dollar they generate
for their employers, our assumption implies that factors other than
concern about local rank reduce the slope of the wage-productivity
gradient by 0.30-from 1.0 to 0.70.13 In the absence of any adjustment,
the entry for research chemists in Table 4 says that the salary of a
member of this group will rise by less than nine cents with every addi-
tional dollar of productivity. To simplify, we round up to ten cents. Ap-
plying the 0.30 adjustment, we then estimate that a chemist's salary
would rise by forty cents with every additional dollar of productivity if
all factors unrelated to local rank could be controlled for. On this es-
timate, a university research chemist would be roughly indifferent be-
tween the following two events: (a) he and his colleagues each receive
a $10,000 increase in salary; and (b) he receives a $4,000 increase in
salary while his colleagues' salaries remain the same.
The amount a worker is willing to pay for an improvement in lo-
cal rank within the firm is an understatement of the value of improved
134 Id at 549.
135 See Spinnewyn, Long Term Contracts (cited in note 130), for a discussion of these fac-
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relative position more generally, because coworkers are just one of
many personal reference groups that matter. Thus, as noted earlier, the
income and consumption levels of neighbors, friends, family members,
and others are also important components of the overall social frame
of reference. Anyone who takes a cut in pay to gain a high-ranked po-
sition vis-A-vis his coworkers will simultaneously suffer reduced in-
come and consumption rank in those other groups. Accordingly, the
amount that workers are willing to sacrifice to hold high-ranked posi-
tions among their coworkers should be smaller than the value they
place on having high (or not low) relative position more generally.
The extent to which willingness to pay for local rank understates
the value of overall relative position will vary inversely with the inten-
sity of coworker interaction. In the extreme case of a firm whose
workers were hermetically sealed off from the rest of the world, the
observed willingness to pay for high local rank would coincide exactly
with the value that workers assign to relative position more generally.
In practice, of course, no such firm exists. Among the three cases ex-
amined in Table 4, not even the relatively insular world of research
chemists would exempt these workers from unfavorable comparisons
outside the workplace. To the extent that external comparisons have
some importance even for members of this group, their observed will-
ingness to pay for local rank will understate their willingness to pay
for overall relative position. A research chemist's willingness to pay
for local rank (adjusted in the manner described above) is thus a good
candidate for use in the construction of a lower-bound estimate of the
value of overall relative position. Our estimate, again, is that such a
worker would be indifferent between a $10,000 across-the-board sal-
ary increase and a $4,000 increase that applied to him alone.
Our next step is to use this estimate to construct an adjustment in
the valuation of safety suggested by conventional methods. Consider
again a worker who earns $50,000 per year and is shown by hedonic
pricing studies to have a reservation price of $1,000 per year for a
0.001 reduction in his annual probability of dying in a workplace acci-
dent. Assuming that he and his coworkers spend equal amounts on
workplace safety, this payment does not reduce his consumption rela-
tive to that of his coworkers, but it produces a $1,000 reduction rela-
tive to other members of his personal reference group.
For the sake of illustration, we again consider the intermediate
case of a worker whose personal reference group consists equally of
coworkers and non-coworkers. For this worker, a $1,000 expenditure
on safety reduces relative income by an average of 1 percent (a zero
percent reduction vis-A-vis his coworkers and a 2 percent reduction
vis-A-vis others). The cost of the additional safety for this worker may
thus be expressed as the sum of two components: the $1,000 direct ex-
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penditure on safety plus the implicit cost of a 1 percent ($500/year)
reduction in relative income."6 What is the latter cost? Our earlier es-
timate tells us that this worker would be indifferent between a $1,000
across-the-board reduction in income and a $400 reduction that ap-
plied to him alone, implying that he would also be indifferent between
a $1,250 across-the-board reduction and a $500 reduction that applied
to him alone. A $500 reduction that applied to him alone, in turn,
would impose two costs-a reduction in absolute living standards by
that amount and the corresponding reduction in relative living stan-
dards. Using CA(500) to represent the first cost, and CR(500) to repre-
sent the second, we have
CA(500) + CR(500) = $1,250.
Since the value of CA(500) is simply $500, we solve for CR(500) =
$750. Under our maintained assumptions, then, the implicit value of a
$500 reduction in relative income is $750. It follows that if this worker
were willing to pay $1,000 for a .001 reduction in the probability of
death despite the implied 1 percent reduction in his relative standard
of living, he would be willing to pay $750 more for that same benefit if
it could be provided without a reduction in relative living standards.
Thus, for cases in which conventional estimates would peg the value of
a life at $5,000,000 on the basis of observed individual willingness to
pay, our estimate would imply a social valuation that is 75 percent lar-
ger, or $8,750,000 per life.
Needless to say, the back-of-the-envelope nature of this estimate,
based on a much less than full inquiry into the contemporary labor
market, leaves it open to criticism. Considerable work remains to be
done before the value of relative position can be estimated with any
precision.13 Our basic claim is not that we have isolated the precise
number, but that even a back-of-the-envelope calculation is likely to
be a closer estimate than we would get by simply ignoring concerns
about relative position. Even crude estimates suggest that ignoring
concerns about relative position has led to significant underestimates
of the social benefit of reductions in risks to health and safety.
136 To simplify, we assume that the cost of a variable decline in relative income vis-A-vis dif-
ferent groups is equal to the cost of an equiproportional decline of the same average amount.
137 One complication is that workers might engage in offsetting behavior, designed to en-
sure a better relative position along the dimension of income even with the regulation. Some
might, for example, seek overtime work or a second job. On the general issue of offsetting behav-
ior, see Adler and Posner, 29 J Legal Stud at 1105 (cited in note 11) (discussing agencies' solu-
tions for valuation problems in cost-benefit analysis when values are distorted by unpredictable
human behavior).
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IV. SHOULD PUBLIC POLICY ADDRESS PROBLEMS THAT STEM
FROM CONCERNS ABOUT RELATIVE POSITION?
Our argument has been based on a claim about the harmful ex-
ternal effects introduced by the increased income of other people. In
our account, increases in the wages of some people impose costs on
others. In form, this is a simple externality story, of the sort that has
become quite conventional in many areas of law and policy. Econo-
mists and noneconomists alike accept the proposition that market al-
locations may be suboptimal when production is accompanied by the
discharge of environmental pollutants, and most concede that air and
water quality are proper concerns of public policy. Our suggestion
here is that because subjective well-being depends on relative wealth,
increases in the income of some people give rise to positional external-
ities.'M Analytically, positional externalities are no different from ordi-
nary environmental pollutants. But although most people accept the
existence of positional externalities as a purely descriptive matter,"9 it
might seem tempting to question whether such externalities are a
proper basis for policy and law. The principal objections involve, first,
freedom and rights, and second, the status of envy.
A. Freedom and Rights
On one view, one person's unhappiness about another's increased
consumption simply does not constitute a legitimate ground for public
138 See Robert H. Frank, Positional Externalities, in Richard J. Zeckhauser, ed, Strategy and
Choice 25 (MIT 1991) (defining positional externalities as actions that "alter an important frame
of reference for others"). We do not deny that many people may derive utility from associating
with others who are as wealthy or wealthier.
139 There is indeed an extensive literature in which economists have discussed the depend-
ence of satisfaction on relative living standards. In addition to the authors previously cited, see
Richard A. Easterlin, Will Raising the Incomes of All Increase the Happiness of All?, 27 J Econ
Beh & Org 35, 35-47 (1995) (finding that positional concerns shift material norms up as income
rises); Bernard M.S. van Praag, The Relativity of the Welfare Concept, in Martha C. Nussbaum
and Amartya Sen, eds, The Quality of Life 362,379-81 (Clarendon 1993) (finding that positional
concerns become more pronounced with age and increased income); Arthur J. Robson, Status,
the Distribution of Wealth, Private and Social Attitudes to Risk, 60 Econometrica 837, 837-57
(1992) (assessing the effect of positional concerns on risk taking); Amartya Sen, The Standard of
Living: Lecture I, Concepts and Critiques, in Geoffrey Hawthorn, ed, The Standard of Living: The
Tanner Lectures 1, 17-19 (Cambridge 1987) (arguing that absolutist view of poverty in terms of
capabilities is more realistic in assessing standards of living); Amartya Sen, Poor, Relatively
Speaking, 35 Oxford Econ Papers 153, 153-69 (1983) (advocating an absolutist view of poverty);
Arie Kapteyn and Floor G. van Herwaarden, Interdependent Welfare Functions and Optimal In-
come Distribution, 14 J Pub Econ 375, 380-90 (1980) (finding that relative living standard con-
cerns make an equal income distribution suboptimal); Tibor Scitovsky, The Joyless Economy:An
Inquiry into Human Satisfaction and Consumer Dissatisfaction (Oxford 1976); Hirsch, Social
Limits to Growth at 1-12 (cited in note 53); Easterlin, Does Economic Growth Improve the Hu-
man Lot? at 89-125 (cited in note 57) (finding that people who are economically well-off are
more likely to be happy than their poorer counterparts).
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action. Smith may be unhappy that Jones consumes more than he
does, but the solution is for Smith to mind his own business. On this
view, restricting Jones's consumption because it makes Smith unhappy
is essentially no different from telling Jones that he cannot engage in
other forms of private conduct to which Smith has some objection,
such as reading left-wing magazines, or dating people from another re-
ligion, or refusing to floss his teeth. Jones is entitled to engage in such
conduct, and that right trumps Smith's concerns.
This objection has obvious rhetorical force; we may agree that the
mere fact that conduct is objectionable, or imposes offense, is no
ground for legal intervention. Yet the objection elides many difficul-
ties.'° People who dislike conduct that they deem objectionable are
entitled to bargain with others to prevent them from engaging in that
conduct, and when cash payments are not made, implicit accommoda-
tions are made all the time, so as to ensure that people do not give one
another mutual offense. When bargaining is possible, coercion should
certainly be disfavored. But what the argument from "rights" ignores
is more fundamental than this-the possibility that with respect to
relative position, people may well find themselves in a position in
which they are competing to their collective detriment, and some form
of mutual restraint may make all, or almost all, better off. Our claim is
about a collective action problem, not about the legitimacy of taxing
people whenever they bother, offend, or irritate others.
Consider, for example, the job seeker who gains an advantage
over his rivals by showing up for his interview in an expensive, cus-
tom-tailored suit. Acting as individuals, the best response for his rivals
may be to show up in expensive, custom-tailored suits as well. Even
though all job seekers might strongly prefer the alternative in which
all spent less on their professional wardrobes, they are stuck with the
extra expense. If it were somehow practical for all job seekers to meet
and discuss the issue, they might vote unanimously for a proposal to
140 Among other things, the example shows a problem with the traditional interpretation of
John Stuart Mill's idea that government cannot regulate private conduct unless there is "harm to
others." See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays 88-104 (MacMillan 1926). Speaking
purely descriptively, a gain to one may impose a "harm" on others, not only because of envy but
for other reasons as well. See notes 52-56 and accompanying text. A judgment that this harm
cannot count for law and policy may be right, but it must be defended by some kind of claim
about the illegitimacy of taking certain harms into account, and not on the basis of the "harm to
others" idea alone. It is the question of legitimacy that we discuss in the text.
An unhappy implication is that what is standardly seen as a Pareto improvement may not be
a Pareto improvement. Consider a two-person society, in which A has 2 and B has 2 (both meas-
uring material payoffs). If a change is instituted by which A has 20 and B has 400 (in material
payoffs), A might be worse off, because of changes in the social frame of reference, or envy, or
harm to self-conception. The problem can be avoided if we see the numbers as reflecting well-
being rather than strictly material payoffs. In that case, the material shift just described will make
A worse off, and thus not count as a Pareto improvement at all.
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prohibit interviewees from showing up in a suit costing more than, say,
$300. On what grounds might we then conclude that this proposal is il-
legitimate? Because it violates the individual job seeker's freedom?
That would be a strange objection indeed if each job seeker had just
voted in favor of the restriction. If each had wanted to restrict his own
freedom in precisely this way, disallowing their agreement would sim-
ply make them worse off-and in an important sense diminish their
freedom as well. 1'
Some might object that such an agreement could never command
unanimous support in the first place. Perhaps there would always be
some people whose purpose in wearing custom-tailored suits had
nothing to do with wanting to gain advantage over their fellow job
seekers. And because the restriction would make such persons worse
off, they could hardly be expected to support it. As a practical matter,
then, a proposal to limit wardrobe expenses might receive a majority
vote, but never a unanimous one.
Yet we do not require unanimity as a precondition for unques-
tionably legitimate collective action in other spheres. There is no gen-
eral power of veto on the part of isolated losers. Because most of us
value cleaner air, for example, we require motorists to maintain emis-
sion control equipment on their cars, even though some motorists do
not care at all about air quality and would be delighted not to have to
incur this extra cost. In these and other cases in which important
common goals are at stake, we are prepared to restrict what might
seem to be individual freedom in the name of the greater good, one of
whose components is the perceived freedom of those who seek to es-
cape from a prisoner's dilemma.
B. Envy?
A possible basis for denying the legitimacy of positional concerns
is that society has an interest in discouraging negative emotions, above
all envy, and that in any case it ought not reward those who are envi-
ous. Perhaps the reason that some are harmed by the income of others
is that they are envious; and though envy is a genuine hedonic loss, it
might seem wrong to suggest that government has a legitimate inter-
est in taxing those who induce envy in others. To be sure, our argu-
ment for reassessing willingness to pay would impose no tax on activi-
141 Alternatively, one might object that an agreement limiting what job seekers spend on
suits is bound to be unenforceable. After all, if wearing a better suit than others really does help
you win the job, there will be powerful incentives to evade the spending limit. One could buy a
suit off the rack, for example, and then make under-the-table payments to a tailor who com-
pletely re-cuts it. This objection might indeed prove decisive. But it concerns the practicality of
the proposal, not its political legitimacy.
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ties merely because they arouse envy. But the logic of the argument
might seem to support that conclusion.'2
We do not attempt to answer here the complex question whether
reducing envy is a legitimate basis for social and legal policy.'3 On
purely utilitarian grounds, it might seem to be, except for the fact that
rewarding envy may have unfortunate social effects-by, for example,
discouraging production and encouraging further envy, used strategi-
cally or otherwise. At the same time, envy might have desirable social
effects insofar as it encourages productive activities.T4 For many peo-
ple, the question of whether envy should count as a social cost will un-
doubtedly depend partly on whether it is unfairness that has produced
the envy.
What is far more important for current purposes is that we have
not been urging attention to relative position on grounds of envy, for
even the purely psychological consequences of inferior relative posi-
tion often have nothing to do with envy. Envy aside, the wealth and
consumption of other people sets the frame of reference for our
evaluation of our own wealth and consumption, and this effect is im-
possible to avoid.' The frame of reference is inevitably set socially,
not individually, and our experience of social goods-and to some ex-
tent our reputation and our self-conception-will be a function of that
frame. In a remote mountain village in India, people can function well
without owning an automobile, yet a middle-class citizen in Los Ange-
les cannot meet even the most minimal demands of social existence
without one. This point generalizes to a broad spectrum of goods.
When almost everyone has a computer produced in, say, 2005, your
computer from 1995 will not only seem hopelessly slow and outdated,
its performance will place you at a real competitive disadvantage; but
if everyone had computers built in 1995, far less would be amiss. Envy
is not involved here; the problem is the frame of reference, which is
142 For a discussion of whether tax policy should respond to positional concerns, see Frank,
Luxury Fever at 227-31 (cited in note 102).
143 The point is treated in some detail in John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 530-41 (Belknap
1971); Rawls urges (to summarize a complex discussion) that rational people do not feel envy
when inequalities are not unjust.
144 The question here is whether people would work too little in the absence of envy; it is
also possible that envy would induce excessive labor. For a general discussion, see Richard H.
McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 Yale L J 1 (1992) (discussing the tension inherent in relative
preferences between wasteful diversion of resources to satisfy positional wants and stimulation
of supply of goods).
145 It might be said here that those who have a lower frame of reference lack information
about possible alternatives. This way of understanding the point is not entirely wrong, but it is
imprecise and insufficiently informative; what we mean to emphasize is that the frame of refer-
ence is provided socially, not individually, and that any frame of reference will have effects, some
of them adverse, on people who must live with it. If most people have cars that are 10 percent
worse than they might otherwise be, the problem is not that people lack information, but that the
relatively less good car produces more satisfaction that it otherwise would.
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not within any individual's control. The point holds for people at every
level of the economic ladder, except the extremely poor (for whom, it
will be recalled, an absolute economic gain is always important, sub-
jectively as well as objectively). Indeed, some of the effects described
here appear driven largely by the same neurophysiological mecha-
nisms that explain why a Helsinki resident's evaluation of a 60 degree
day in February is more favorable that a Havana resident's evaluation
of a 60 degree day in November.
Contextual forces of this general sort influence almost every
conceivable dimension of product quality evaluation. Writing more
than two centuries ago, for example, Adam Smith introduced the
important idea that local consumption standards influence the goods
and services that people consider essential (or "necessaries," as Smith
called them). In the following passage, for example, he described the
factors that influence the amount an individual must spend on
clothing in order to be able to appear in public "without shame."
By necessaries I understand, not only the commodities which are
indispensably necessary for the support of life, but whatever the
custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people,
even of the lowest order, to be without. A linen shirt, for exam-
ple, is, strictly speaking, not a necessary of life. The Greeks and
Romans lived, I suppose, very comfortably, though they had no
linen. But in the present times, through the greater part of
Europe, a creditable day-labourer would be ashamed to appear
in public without a linen shirt, the want of which would be sup-
posed to denote that disgraceful degree of poverty, which, it is
presumed, no body can well fall into without extreme bad con-
duct. Custom, in the same manner, has rendered leather shoes a
necessary of life in England. The poorest creditable person of ei-
ther sex would be ashamed to appear in public without them.'
The absolute standard of living in the United States today is
vastly higher than it was in Adam Smith's eighteenth-century Scot-
land. Yet Smith's observations apply with equal force to contemporary
industrial societies. Consider, for instance, the journalist Dirk John-
son's account of the experiences of Wendy Williams, a middle-school
student from a low-income family in Dixon, Illinois.
Watching classmates strut past in designer clothes, Wendy Wil-
liams sat silently on the yellow school bus, wearing a cheap belt
and rummage-sale slacks. One boy stopped and yanked his
thumb, demanding her seat.
146 Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 821-22
(Random House Modem Library ed 1937).
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"Move it, trailer girl," he sneered.
It has never been easy to live on the wrong side of the tracks. But
in the economically robust 1990's, with sprawling new houses and
three-car garages sprouting like cornstalks on the Midwestern
prairie, the sting that comes with scarcity gets rubbed with an ex-
tra bit of salt.
To be without money, in so many ways, is to be left out.
"I told this girl: 'That's a really awesome shirt. Where did you get
it?"' said Wendy, explaining that she knew it was out of her price
range, but that she wanted to join the small talk. "And she looked
at me and laughed and said, 'Why would you want to know?"'
A lanky, soft-spoken girl with large brown eyes, Wendy pursed
her lips to hide a slight overbite that got her the nickname Rab-
bit, a humiliation she once begged her mother and father to avoid
by sending her to an orthodontist.
For struggling parents, keenly aware that adolescents agonize
over the social pecking order, the styles of the moment and the
face in the mirror, there is a no small sense of failure in telling a
child that she cannot have what her classmates take for granted.
"Do you know what it's like?" asked Wendy's mother, Veronica
Williams, "to have your daughter come home and say, 'Mom, the
kids say my clothes are tacky,' and then walk off with her head
hanging low.'' 7
An adolescent in eighteenth-century Scotland would not have
been much embarrassed by having a slight overbite, because not even
the wealthiest members of society wore braces on their teeth then.
Rising living standards have altered the frame of reference that de-
fines an acceptable standard of cosmetic dentistry. The toll that low
relative position takes on individuals is no less legitimate because it
occurs in psychological rather than explicitly monetary terms.
To acknowledge that important economic, psychological, and
even physical rewards are significantly affected by the spending of
others is simply to note an obvious fact of the human condition. Be-
cause each individual's consumption affects the frame of reference
within which others must make important choices, this frame of refer-
ence is no less legitimate an object of public concern than the quality
of our air and water.
147 Dirk Johnson, When Money Is Everything, Except Hers, NY Times Al (Oct 14,1998).
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Nor is the frame of reference the only important point. Apart
from envy, people might care about relative position as a signal of
ability. In competitive settings, people of high ability tend to earn and
consume more than people of low ability. Given the importance of
first impressions in many social and professional settings, such signals
often entail significant real costs. Part of the hedonic loss from having
low relative position may thus stem from these costs, which them-
selves have nothing to do with envy.
There is a related point about sigpaling. You might not like being
in the bottom 30 percent, not because of envy, but because your rela-
tive position may signal others' beliefs about your future prospects. If
an employer pays you less than most of your fellow employees, or if
you earn less than most people in your town, you might worry that
others think, or will think, less of you. Such a signal might harm your
relations with others and injure your self-conception, even if you are
entirely immune from envy.
As a purely descriptive matter, concerns about relative position
cause current methods to underestimate public willingness to pay for
risk reduction and a variety of other benefits by substantial margins.
To the extent that we accept citizens' preferences as the basis for pol-
icy, we have every reason to believe that correcting for this bias will
lead to policy changes that meet public favor.
V. LIMITS AND EXTENSIONS
In this section we venture some brief remarks on two questions
that will eventually deserve extended treatment. The first involves the
fact that many regulations involve subclasses of people, rather than
(for example) all workers. The second involves the implications of our
argument for the much-discussed question of nonwaivable contractual
terms.
A. General and Less General Programs
Thus far we have written as if the effects of the program at issue
will be felt by all persons in the relevant class-as if an environmental
regulation would reduce all income by the same amount, or as if an
occupational safety and health law would reduce workers' earnings at
the same time and in the same way. When this is the case, the regula-
tion may produce something close to a Pareto improvement-holding
relative position constant with respect to income (and thus imposing
little or no loss on that dimension), but offering workers a benefit with
respect to a less positional or nonpositional good (such as safety or
leisure time). Of course, things are more complicated than this. Some
occupational and safety regulations, for example, will affect distinct
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subclasses of workers -as, for example, when a regulation of coal dust
applies largely in the mining industry, but without affecting most other
workers at all,"s or when a regulation of HIV transmission affects
workers in the dental and health care industries, but without applying
elsewhere.'
When regulation affects subclasses of workers, its positional ef-
fects will differ from the ones we described above, where all lose in
absolute position, but where relative position is held constant. When
subclasses are affected, some will gain in relative position and some
will lose. Consider, for example, a safety regulation that applies only to
dental workers. In contrast to a regulation that imposes an equally
costly safety requirement on all workers-which, as noted above, does
not affect relative living standards-this more limited regulation will
reduce the relative living standards of dental workers. To the extent
that the personal reference groups of dental workers consist largely of
non-dental workers, the regulation will make it more difficult for den-
tal workers to match the consumption standards that constitute their
social frame of reference.
In such cases, conventional estimates of how much individual
dental workers are willing to pay for the regulatory benefit may not
significantly understate the social value of the additional safety to den-
tal workers. By hypothesis, the relative income of dental workers is
declining. Even in this case, however, the private willingness to pay of
dental workers will understate the social value of the regulation. The
reason is that the decline in relative living standards experienced by
dental workers is counterbalanced by an increase in relative living
standards experienced by others in their social comparison group.
Relative position cannot be reduced in the aggregate. When some lose
position, others necessarily gain. One upshot is that if dental workers
are armed with perfect information, and if they know that their rela-
tive and absolute income will decline, a regulation that affects dental
workers alone is less likely to be popular among dental workers than
one that affects all workers in the relevant social comparison group.
Another upshot is that while the more general regulation may pro-
duce something close to a Pareto improvement, with few real losers,
the more targeted regulation cannot be justified on that ground. If
government is nonetheless to use numbers of the sort we are urging, it
will be on Kaldor-Hicks grounds-the gainers (including the gainers
in terms of relative position) are gaining more than the losers (includ-
148 See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub L No 91-596,84 Stat 1590, codified
at 29 USC §§ 651 et seq (1994); Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs at 161-77 (cited in note 7).
149 See American Dental Association v Martin, 984 F2d 823, 824 (7th Cir 1993) (finding
OSHA regulations governing bloodborne pathogens reasonable in application to health care
employment).
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ing the losers in terms of relative position) are losing. In other words,
there is a distributional shift, in terms of relative position, with the
more targeted regulation, whereas there is no such shift with the gen-
eral one.
In other cases, a regulation may not alter the relative position of
those affected by it, even though it applies only to a narrow occupa-
tional group. For example, if the relevant social comparison group for
coal miners consists largely of other coal miners, a safety regulation
that applies only to coal miners would not alter relative position
within that group.
In practice, of course, most regulations are likely to fall some-
where along the continuum between these extremes. How, in such
cases, is our analysis affected by the fact that regulations target sub-
classes of people, and not everyone at once? The extent to which an
individual's private willingness to pay understates the social benefits
of a regulation generally will not vary with its breadth of coverage, but
the popularity of the regulation among those directly affected will
tend to be lower the more narrowly the regulation is targeted."0
Political resistance to safety regulation is thus likely to be greater
when regulation is done on a piecemeal basis than when it is proposed
as part of a more comprehensive package. In addition, distributional
concerns might be raised by piecemeal regulation insofar as it alters
existing relative positions."'
B. Extensions
The argument we have made has obvious implications for the
question whether law should impose nonwaivable terms-as, for ex-
ample, through legislation involving maximum hours, job security, pa-
rental leave, health care, and leave time. Let us continue to assume
that the cost of workers' rights, when they are not waived, will be
borne in whole or in part by workers, in the sense that the legal grant
of a right, to workers, will result in a lower paycheck. The standard
view is that if labor markets are generally competitive, nonwaivable
terms cannot be justified as promoting the interests of the supposedly
benefited class.1
52
150 Admittedly, there is no evidence for this phenomenon; people appear to think that they
will benefit from narrowly targeted regulation.
151 We do not believe, however, that this is the most serious of imaginable distributional
concerns. In the abstract, there is no reason to think that the losers, in terms of relative position,
had any entitlement to their antecedent relative position; and we are not, after all, speaking of
redistribution from poor to rich. For a general discussion of distributional concerns and cost-
benefit analysis, see various conference papers in Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Economic, and
Philosophical Perspectives, 29 J Legal Stud 837,837-1177 (2000).
152 Some important qualifications come from Jolls, 99 Stan L Rev at 242-72 (cited in note
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We submit that the standard view is far too simple. If workers
care about relative position, nohwaivable rights might, in principle,
make workers better off on the dimension along which they are
helped (by giving them something important) while also not making
them significantly worse off along the dimension along which they are
apparently harmed (by decreasing their income while also decreasing
that of everyone else). The promising possibility here is that legal ini-
tiatives will produce real gains of one or another kind (for example,
leisure time, health care, job security, which are, by hypothesis, mostly
nonpositional goods), without producing concomitant real losses (be-
cause the only loss is to absolute position in terms of income, a more
positional good).
To offer slightly more detail: Assume that relative rather than ab-
solute economic position is what most workers care about-that
worker well-being would not be decreased by (say) a decrease in an-
nual wages of $250, $500, or $1000, so long as all workers face the
same decrease. In that event, some nonwaivable terms, such as a right
to job security, might be justified on the ground that the consequence
of the new term is to decrease absolute income but to hold relative in-
come constant, thus imposing little or no welfare loss on workers,
while at the same time giving workers a substantial benefit, such as job
security. As far as the worker is concerned, the substantial benefit is
given essentially for free, because relative position is held constant-
an apparently powerful argument for a wide range of nonwaivable
workers' rights.
Of course this argument cannot be shown to be convincing in the
abstract. It raises several questions. Perhaps relative position is also
what workers care about with respect to the new, legally granted bene-
fit; perhaps this too is a positional good. Undoubtedly most goods
have a mixture of positional and nonpositional features. As we have
suggested, it does seem reasonable to say that many of the goods pro-
tected by nonwaivable terms-health care, vacation time, leisure, job
security-have strong nonpositional features; it is important to have
these things regardless of what other people have. At least these goods
tend to be less observable than income, and also tend to be valued in
large part for their absolute qualities. Of course it is important to ask
to what extent income is actually a positional good for the relevant
class of workers, since, for very poor workers, absolute income may be
what matters most.
CONCLUSION
Cost-benefit analysis is an increasingly pervasive practice within
the national government, and it promises to grow as a tool of decision
in the next decades. The first generation debates involved whether to
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do cost-benefit analysis at all. The second generation debates, now at
their inception, involve debates about appropriate valuation.
Our minimal submission here has been that the current numbers
for regulatory benefits are too low, because they neglect the fact that
people care about relative economic position, not only absolute eco-
nomic position. In terms of the very framework used to defend cost-
benefit analysis, the current numbers should be increased. More
speculatively, we have suggested that the current numbers should be
boosted by as much as 75 percent. More conservatively, analysts might
use the arguments offered here as a rationale for choosing estimates
near the upper end of the range of values produced by contingent
valuation and hedonic pricing methods.
We have also suggested that it is entirely legitimate for govern-
ment to take account of positional externalities, which create a pris-
oner's dilemma for those subject to them. People care about relative
position not only and not even mostly because of envy, nor even be-
cause of status anxiety, but because the position of others sets a gen-
eral frame of reference within which economic and social activity
takes place.'53
The point bears not only on cost-benefit analysis, but also on a
wide range of regulatory possibilities, including nonwaivable contract
terms in the labor market. If relative position is what matters to most
workers, nonwaivable terms, if generally imposed, may turn out to be
justified even if the result of such terms is to lower workers' salaries.
This suggestion is a natural corollary of our basic argument here: Any
approach to valuation that concentrates solely on absolute economic
position, and neglects relative economic position, will produce out-
comes that are wrong in terms of the conventional arguments hat jus-
tify cost-benefit analysis in the first place.
153 For recent evidence, see Bewley, Why Wages Don't Fall during a Recession at 70-109
(cited in note 82).
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